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Currently the Armed Forces of the United States employ 
numerous radio sets to establish the tactical networks that 
are required to communicate across the vast territories 
that make up a battlefield environment.  These radio sets 
include (but are not limited to) AN/PRC-150(C) HF, SINCGARS 
VHF, & AN/ARC-210 UHF radios. In every instance, these sets 
require individualized training, repair, calibration, and 
testing to ensure that they all operate properly when 
utilized. Compounding the problem is the fact that these 
independent systems often have difficulty cross-
communicating, as a result of diverse issues such as 
incorrect time hacks, outdated fills, or improper frequency 
ID’s. The list of problems goes on and on. The way the 
Marine Corps has dealt with this is to establish a tactical 
network that acts as liaison between various elements. 
However, these networks slow down the passing of 
information and even contribute to the loss of words, 
phrases, and (often times) the entire meaning of what is 
being communicated. 
The recent emergence of the Global Information Grid 
(GIG) brings a veritable cornucopia of information and a 
network of resources that would be normally unreachable 
through legacy UHF/VHF/HF communications equipment. To 
access data, the Department of Defense in general, and the 
Marine Corps specifically, needs to adopt communications 
devices which can speak an identical language.  IP-based 
radios are the only viable option that can serve as the  
 
 vi
vehicle that ties the modern Marine Corps to Network-
Centric Warfare and its expeditionary connectivity to the 
GIG. 
Today, modern technology exists which can allow each 
of these disparate elements to communicate. A few off-the-
shelf (OTS) systems have been fielded which allow units to 
communicate across great distances as well as in urban 
terrains. Additionally, these IP-based radio sets allow 
tremendous amounts of data to be passed and are not 
restricted to simply transmitting voice communications.  
Besides voice, these IP-based radios can also transmit data 
through various software packages.  These include video, 
GPS data, time/date stamping, and many other pieces of 
information that increase the situational awareness of all 
players, from the infantryman to the Corps Commander. 
With the increasing need for greater information at 
all levels, the time has come for the Marine Corps (and the 
DOD in a larger sense) to break from obsolete forms of 
communications and embrace technologies that will reduce 
the fog of war, reduce the potential for blue-on-blue 
engagements, and increase the situational awareness of the 
warfighter on the tactical, operational and strategic 
levels. 
The author’s research will show that a new 
communication architecture utilizing IP-based radios as the 
core component will allow the Marine Corps to develop into 
a adaptive force that can access greater amounts of data 
available via its connectivity to the GIG and as a result 
of its adoption of Network-Centric Warfare. 
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In modern warfare, the enemy is far more 
difficult to identify.  No physical frontier 
separates the two camps.  The line of demarcation 
between friend and foe passes through the very 
heart of the nation, through the same village, 
and sometimes divides the same family.  It is a 
non-physical, often ideological boundary, which 
must however be expressly delineated if we want 
to reach the adversary and to defeat him. 
Roger Trinquier1 
A. BACKGROUND 
In every endeavor, in each theatre of operation, in 
every clime and place, Marines need to communicate with 
their chain of command.  The reasons are as manifold as the 
shifting winds, but the primary focus is to be connected to 
a network of commands that drive the fight and shape the 
battlefield.  The tactical networks, as they are currently 
constructed, are established when the Marines come ashore, 
begin to prepare for combat, and are based upon an age-old 
paradigm that has not fundamentally changed since the first 
radio pair saw combat. 
On the ground, the Marine Corps employs networks such 
as the Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC) and its 
subordinate branches like the Force Fires Coordination 
Center (FFCC), the Air Support Section (ASS) and Target 
Information Center (TIC).  Additionally, integration of new 
systems like the emerging Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade 
and Below (FBCB2) System within these networks in order to 
increase battlespace awareness.  Systems like FBCB2 are 
                     1 Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare:  A French View on 
Counterinsurgency (London, England:  Pall Mall Press, 1964), p.26. 
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digitized Battle Command Information Systems that are 
linked through Enhanced Precision Locating and Reporting 
System (EPLRS) and Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio 
System (SINCGARS) tactical nets and providing better 
situational awareness (SA) while improving Command and 
Control (C2).  Coordinating these is the Supporting Arms 
Coordination Center (SACC), which keeps artillery and naval 
gunfire from accidentally engaging friendly aircraft or 
friendly ground troops.   
These tactical networks are defined and operated based 
on current Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) doctrine 
and has as its backbone a suite of HF, VHF, and UHF radio 
sets2.  Current technologies are being stretched to the 
limits of physics and various coding schemes are emerging 
to try and squeeze out more room on an already crowded 
Electro-Magnetic (EM) spectrum.  A paradigm shift in 
communication equipment is required which calls for an 
architecture of technologies, whose protocols allow for 
expansion, the unique identification of recipients, and the 
ability to talk to one person or all persons on the 
network. 
B. OBJECTIVES 
The implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 
1986 compelled the armed forces to rethink their core 
operating concepts in an effort to focus them on becoming 
more synchronized with the developments of their parallel 
service and future concepts.  According to some experts, 
“the largest problem for security force is how to control 
                     2 MCWP 3-40.1, Marine Air-Ground Task Force Command and Control, 
(Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2003) p.8-1. 
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vertical organizations in an increasingly horizontal world.  
The military service - Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines - 
are essentially vertical organizations with clearly defined 
roles and missions.  With the advent of air power, the 
lines become blurred and the need for jointness - the 
horizontal - increased sharply.”3  The need for a new 
paradigm communication architecture going from the 
Napoleonic hierarchy to one based on the needs of 
information flow is an absolutely critical requirement 
associated with this “horizontal” shift.  This 
groundbreaking shift will also assist in the eventual 
transition of the Marine Corps toward its goal of being a 
viable part of a Network-Centric force. 
This thesis is intended to explore the feasibility of 
a tactical network, based upon a mesh topology such as 
Mobile Adhoc Networks (MANET)4, as it applies to disparate 
organizational structures.  Currently, the United States 
Marine Corps is experimenting with a concept that increases 
the distribution of traditional forces across the modern 
battlefield.  This concept is known as Distributed 
Operations (DO).  The concept of DO attempts to maximize 
the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF)5 Commander’s 
ability to employ small tactical units across the depth and 
breadth of a nonlinear battlespace in order to achieve 
favorable intelligence-driven engagements as part of the                      3 Denis J. Quinn, The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act:  A 
Ten-Year Retrospective, (Washington, DC:  National Defense University 
Press, 1999), p.3. 
4 MANET Charter, Apr 7, 2007, 
<http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/manet-charter.html> (last accessed 
Aug 28 200). 
5 GlobalSecurity.Org, MAGTF, Apr 6, 2006, 
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/usmc/magtf.htm> (last 
accessed Aug 28, 2007) 
 4
Joint Force Commander’s overall campaign6.  The USMC has 
further developed the concept of employing DO units, which 
are commonly platoon sized elements, from within its 
traditional infantry battalion as an additional capability 
within the force. This affords the commander the ability to 
use the force as an additive and scalable capability that 
exists within the framework of a currently fielded infantry 
battalion. 
The objective of this research is to illuminate 
current challenges, as well as the future benefits derived 
from deploying a ubiquitous MANET which contains the 
hallmarks of a mesh, namely self-awareness, self-healing, 
scalability, and routability within widely dispersed combat 
organization similar to a DO unit.  This thesis will also 
address the network and the command structure as it relates 
to Network-Centric warfare. 
According to MCDP 1-2, Campaigning, “the conduct of a 
successful campaign requires the integration of many 
disparate efforts.  Effective action in any single 
warfighting function is rarely decisive in and of itself.  
We obtain maximum impact when we harmonize all warfighting 
functions to accomplish the desired strategic objective in 
the shortest time possible and with minimal casualties.”7  
We ensure thorough coverage throughout the breadth of the 
battlefield by focusing the context of the campaign on six 
                     6 Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, Questions and Answers About 
Distributed Operations, Mar 16, 2005, p.1. 
7 MCDP 1-2, Campaigning, (Washington, D.C.:  Government Printing 
Office, 1997) p.76.  
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major functions:  command and control, maneuver, fires, 
intelligence, logistics, and force protection.8 
The authors do not intend this thesis to be a panacea 
for the Department of Defense efforts in finding a 
wired/wireless solution to the tactical internet.  This is 
merely the exploration of one possible solution.  There are 
several assumptions that are made in the research 
conducted, which will be explained in due course. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research question deals with a fundamental 
shift in the communications equipment paradigm within the 
Marine Corps.  How will going from a voice-based, push-to-
talk device to a much more sophisticated IP-based device 
that is capable of delivering voice communications, as well 
as providing data serve the needs of the Marine Corps?  
What are the warfighting benefits that the Marine Corps can 
achieve as a result of adopting an IP-based communications 
system?   
D. SCOPE 
The scope of this thesis is left intentionally wide to 
enable follow-on research and to allow other researchers to 
vary the methods and ideas to develop multiple courses of 
action. This is truly the only way to present a viable 
solution to the ultimate users of this research, the United 
States Marine. 
 
                     8 MCDP 1-2, Campaigning, (Washington, D.C.:  Government Printing 
Office, 1997) pp.76-91. 
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E. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology includes extensive research of 
available literature, both hard copy and electronic, on 
underlying MANET theory, the Tactical Internet (TI) being 
developed and deployed by the United States Army, and 
information gathered on the Global Information Grid (GIG).  
Additionally, the authors focused on the historic data 
associated with the Marine Corps Company (and below) 
tactical assets.  The authors sought out diverse sources in 
order to strengthen their knowledge on the various facets 
of wireless mesh networks.  The authors consulted public as 
well as private resources, both academic and proprietary, 
published proceedings of standards organizations, and 
pioneers in the field.  Some of the most extensive research 
and discovery was gathered from the Tactical Network 
Topology (TNT) experiments conducted by Dr. Alex Bordetsky 
at Camp Roberts, CA. 
F. ORGANIZATION OF THIS THESIS 
The organization of this thesis is as follows: 
Chapter I consists of the introduction and the 
abstract.  In this section the authors have laid out the 
background, objectives, research questions, scope and 
methodology.  
 Chapter II discusses the current situation, historic 
events, and the problems faced by Marines when trying to 
communicate across multiple networks (radio, not computer 
networks).  The authors shall present an example of a 
generic DO platoon and the communications equipment that 
they will typically carry into combat.  The scenario shall 
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be developed to demonstrate how they would communicate 
between themselves as well as with higher headquarters. 
Chapter III introduces the current communications 
architecture of DO organizations and will cover a brief 
definition of wireless and mesh networks, to include 
advantages and disadvantages of each, and how they should 
be adapted into a new communications architecture that 
provides for connectivity to the GIG. 
Chapter IV will introduce existing technologies and 
highlight the benefits of utilizing these devices, outline 
the benefits of why the Marine Corps needs to adopt an 
architecture that utilizes these emerging technologies, and 
some recommendations for ways to reorganize and improve 
communication flow.   
Chapter V lists conclusions from research conducted 
within the current state of technology, the scenario 
introduced in Chapter II will be reviewed with these 
benefits in focus. Recommendations for future research will 
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II. STATE OF EXPEDITIONARY MARINE CORPS 
COMMUNICATIONS 
Today's scientists have substituted mathematics 
for experiments, and they wander off through 
equation after equation, and eventually build a 
structure which has no relation to reality. 
Nikola Tesla9 
 
A. OVERVIEW OF CURRENT STATE 
Communication Marines are tasked with the daunting 
mission of managing all of the applications (email, C2 
systems) that Marines are so increasingly dependent upon in 
both the field and in garrison.  Each communications Marine 
receives their basic training in communications school so 
they can differntiate between HF, VHF, and UHF radio sets.  
After this initial schooling, they go through on the job 
training to learn how things are really done.  
Despite years of doing this, we reinvents the wheel 
with each exercise, operation, or combat action.  Radio 
nets are established, tested, broken, and re-established in 
order to maintain constant communications.  Within the last 
few years, communications Marines have had new technologies 
to deal with that increase their repertoire to include 
routers, switches, Domain Name Server (DNS), Exchange 
Servers (mail), Local/Wide Area Networks (LAN/WAN), and 
Internet Protocols (IP)10.  They create and manage email 
accounts, connect (and disconnect) computers into the 
                     9 Nikola Tesla, Modern Mechanics and Inventions, July, 1934 
10 When discussing or referencing IP the authors are specifically 
talking about packet switching networks. 
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network, and establish internet connectivity, file 
services, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), and firewalls.  
Truly, they are the telecommunications Jack of All Trades. 
What is missing in this picture is a constant 
framework or architecture that can be relied upon to supply 
a backbone from which to grow.  A radical movement from 
U/V/HF radio communications to IP based radio 
communications lends itself to greater flexibility with, at 
the very minimum, the same reliability of service as is 
currently being seen.  What the IP paradigm allows is the 
ability to speak anywhere to one or all persons on the 
network, instead of the only option with current radios, 
and talking to everyone, no matter what. 
B. PROBLEMS WITH “AS IS” 
Virtually every communications officer in the military 
knows that a storm is approaching the horizon; meaning that 
the limited RF spectrum is being utilized by more and more 
people and eventually the camel’s back will break with the 
addition of one more straw. 11  As operations grow in scope, 
communicators are being called upon to provide increasing 
detail to commanders that wish to know what is causing 
rifleman Dodd to take Course of Action (COA) A as opposed 
to COA B, and they seek a granularity that radio networks 
were never intended to bring.  Further, since the total 
number of conversations possible is n-1, the possibility of 
a collision is increasingly closer to 100%.  
                     
11 “The electromagnetic spectrum is an increasingly limited resource. 
Most likely without proper management the electromagnetic spectrum will 
quickly reach saturation and will seriously degrade mission 
performance.” FM 24-2 Spectrum Management 
 11
Another problem with traditional radio networks is 
that while one person gets to talk the remaining personnel 
on the network can only listen, even if there is only one 
intended recipient.  First come, first served is the rule 
of the day with no regard to importance or urgency of the 
specific traffic or the person sending that traffic.  
Communications in these instances are susceptible to being 
stepped on when another user keys the microphone, and 
confusion and ambiguities are injected into the equation 
when the intended recipient does not know that they are the 
receiver of a communication stream.  Time and resources are 
wasted in clarifying directed communications. 12 
C. CURRENT AND HISTORIC NETWORK ORGANIZATION 
1. Need for Adaptation 
 Before discussing the technological aspects of this 
problem, certain historic organizational biases must be 
addressed.  Resolving issues associated with communication 
architecture only addresses a small percentage of the 
problem the Marine Corps will face in the coming decades.  
The Marine Corps must also address the aging state of its 
tactical units.  Well before the Vietnam War, infantry 
units attempted to re-organize their linear and archaic 
structure to better meet the needs of the combat leader and 
the warfighter.  The reorganization of these units was 
often driven by the organization of the enemies combat 
                     12 Clayton Craig and Chris Tsirlis. Command and Control for 
Distributed Operations, Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
June 2007.  Research conducted validated the bridging ability of 
current technologies to bridge the gap between legacy systems and 
packet switch systems.  The authors identify that this is a viable 
short-term solution and does not meet the long-term goals of the Marine 
Corps and the DoD as a whole. 
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units.  The driving factor was often an attempt to avoid 
fighting the last war’s adversary. 
 Mark Richter, Program Manager for the Marine 
Expeditionary Rifle Squad (MERS), at Marine Corps System 
Command (MARCORSYSCOM), indicates that the Marine Corps has 
made enormous strides in redefining the infantry squad as a 
system.  In contrast, the Army feels that the individual 
soldier is the system (Land Warrior) 13  that must be re-
defined. 14  The reason this is so germane is because both 
the Army and the Marine Corps have identified that the 
communication nodes and how the communication flow will 
flesh out is essential in the development of a proper 
communication architecture for future communication systems 
which must be adopted by the DoD. 
 Whether communicating between individual units or 
coordinating fires for adjacent units or for themselves, 
the flow of information and adaptability of small units 
operating in this network allow for rapid transitions 
between missions and an ability to respond quickly to 
emerging threats.  For command and control, all channel 
networks are conducive to the dissemination of orders and 
the passing of reports because of their inherent overlap of 
nodes.  This design makes the enemy extremely adaptive and 
requires friendly forces to react to their tighter decision 
loop. 
                     13 Military Analysis Network, Land Warrior, Aug 7, 1999, 
<http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/land-warrior.htm> (last 
accessed Aug 28, 2007) 
14 Mark Richter (Program Manager MERS, MARCORSYSCOM), interviewed by 
Chris C. Curran, request for information on the MERS Program, July 22, 
2007. 
 13
According to John Arquilla, Professor, Department of 
Defense Analysis at the Naval Post-graduate School, 
“Hezbollah conducted five weeks of what many would label as 
extremely effective combat operations against the Israeli 
Defense Force (IDF).  The IDF is considered to be a 
superior fighting force, yet Hezbollah fighters were able 
to effectively battle this larger conventional force using 
tenets of the DO concept.”15  From July 12, 2006 until 
August 14, 2006, Hezbollah forces distributed throughout 
Lebanon battled the IDF long enough to bring cessation of 
combat operations and political victory.16  
 As discussed above, the external environment in which 
close-in-combat will take place has changed dramatically in 
the last decade.  It is therefore paramount that the 
current mature structural organizations of the USMC ground 
forces utilize adaptation to defeat the enemy and their 
organizational structure.  The USMC organizational strategy 
must be adapted to promote mission success through an 
enhanced warfighting capability, increased force 
protection, and an ability to provide for physical 
sustainment of numerous widely disbursed decentralized 
combat units. 
 
                     15 Naval Postgraduate School, October 11, 2006, class lecture. 
16 Derived from: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Winograd Inquiry 
Commission, Apr 30, 2007, 
<http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Communiques/2007/Winograd+Inquiry
+Commission+submits+Interim+Report+30-Apr-2007.htm> (last accessed Aug 
28, 2007) 
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2. Historic Sructure and Adaptability of USMC 
The Marine Corps, for their part, has identified this 
weakness in the current force structure and is working hard 
to lead the US Military in the organizational race to 
counter the insurgent network.  Historically, whether 
defeating the underground fortifications during the island 
hopping campaigns of World War II, the implementation of 
vertical lift and close air support aircraft during the 
Korean conflict, or the successful integration of the 
Combined Action Platoons (CAP) in Vietnam, the Marine Corps 
has always considered itself as visionary and a front 
runner in adapting and countering an emerging foe.   
 Recognizing the threat associated with combat in the 
jungles of Vietnam, the USMC initiated the CAP program 
which forced the traditional rifle platoon to be 
deconstructed from the linear structure and dispersed in 
hamlets throughout the jungles of Vietnam.  This dispersion 
of platoon-sized forces throughout the depths and breadths 
of a non-linear battlefield limited the enemy’s ability to 
maintain any semblance of preeminence on the non-linear 
battlefield.  By disbursing squads of Marines, who were 
combined with elements of the South Vietnamese Popular 
Forces (PF's), and requiring them to live among them in the 
surrounding villages, the CAP concept came into being.  As 
a result, the Marines expanded, tested and evaluated the 
concept and found it to be effective in countering Viet 
Cong influence and control of the local area. 17 
                     17 William Go, The Marine Corps' Combined Action Program and Modern 
Peace Operations - Common Themes and Lessons, USMC Command and Staff 
College, 1997, p.9. 
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Figure 1.   CAP Organization circa 196818 
 
3. A New Organizational Concept is Introduced 
 Today, the USMC continues to experiment with arming 
and equipping small units that are designed to dominate the 
battlefield using infestation19 or swarming warfare. 20  The 
USMC refers to this concept as “distributed operations” 
(DO).  DO, simply put, is the use of platoon sized units 
ashore which have transitioned away from the chain network 
and formed itself as an all channel network21.  The DO 
platoon remains connected through technology, lethal 
through integrated fires, and capable through increased                      18 Brooks Brewington, Combined Action Platoons: A Strategy for Peace 
Enforcement, USMC Command and Staff College, 1997, p.34. 
19 Gary W. Anderson, “Implementing OMFTS:  Infestation and 
Investation,” Marine Corps Gazette, April 1995, p.57.  
20 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Swarming & The Future of 
Conflict, (RAND, 2000), p.7. 
21 Naval Postgraduate School Brief, Nov 20, 2006, lecture, Technology 
Change and Networks, dated 3 November 2003, slide 9 of PowerPoint brief 
by Deborah Gibbons. 
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training at all levels.  The DO concept equals any cutting 
edge adaptation in the history of the Marine Corps and is 
the right fix at the right time.  The DO organization will 
be defined in greater detail in chapter III. 
4. The Evolution of Distributed Operations 
 The DO concept was formally introduced and adopted 
soon after the USMC’s unprecedented tactical successes 
during the bloody battle for Fallujah, Iraq, in November 
2004.  During Operation AL-FAJR, in Fallujah, Iraq, 
countless Marines were skillfully led by their small unit 
leaders who capably executed high intensity conflict 
operations within the non-linear, urban battlefield.  More 
remarkable was the small unit leader’s ability to lead 
these marines in much greater decentralized environments 
than ever imagined possible.  According to General Michael 
W. Hagee, the former Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC), 
Operation AL-FAJR validated and further solidified the 
needs and tenets of the DO concept.  In response to the 
type of warfare his Marines were engaged in, General Hagee 
provided guidance on the further definition and 
experimentation with the concept of DO 22. 
 The DO concept meets the needs for a force that can 
operate independently within a non-linear battlefield while 
still being able to function in traditional infantry roles 
on order.  The Marine Corps Warfighting Lab (MCWL) 
officially implemented what had been only an experiment in 
recent years.  Within a year of the current Global War on 
                     22 Michael W. Hagee, “ALMAR 018/05,” Apr 18, 2005, 
<http://www.usmc.mil/almars/almar2000.nsf/52f4f5d11f10b4c4852569b8006a3
e35/35a74723d7bcc61085256fe70061040a?OpenDocument> (last accessed Aug 
28, 2007). 
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Terrorism (GWOT), DO units were conducting decentralized 
combat operations in Afghanistan.  The ability to make this 
fundamental shift in warfighting techniques ensures the 
USMC will remain the force in readiness that it has always 
been.  With the development of DO, the Marine Corps will 
have an additive, lethal capability inherent to its current 
force structure.  General Hagee summarizes his plan in the 
following quote: 
While ever ready to respond to major combat 
operations, the future holds a greater likelihood 
of irregular wars fought in urban environments, 
against thinking enemies using asymmetric 
tactics.  Thus, we will adapt our tactics, 
techniques, and procedures as well as technology 
to enhance our capabilities to succeed in these 
environments.23 
5. Distributed Operations in Afghanistan 
 Since the beginning of the GWOT, two infantry platoons 
have been designated as DO Platoons.  The first from the 
3rd Marine Regiment in Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii, and the other 
from the 5th Marine Regiment out of Camp Pendleton, 
California.  The first was a platoon from 1st Battalion, 
3rd Marines and the second was a platoon from 1st 
Battalion, 5th Marines.   
 Since the inception of the DO model, only the 1st 
Battalion, 3rd Marine Regiments DO Platoon has seen combat.  
The DO Platoon from 1st Battalion, 3rd Marine Regiment 
proved its worth during the battalion’s five month 
deployment to the Kunar Area of Northern Afghanistan.   
                     23 Carl Desantis (Platoon Commander, DO Platoon, 1st battalion, 3rd 
Marines) Interview by Mr. Peter Dotto, Marine Corps Center For Lessons 
Learned, Jul 19, 2006. 
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 The “Lava Dogs” of Task Force Chosin were able to 
employ their DO Platoon exactly how the CMC and MCWL 
envisioned the unit being used.  Their primary missions in 
Afghanistan were traditional in nature, but the geographic 
area that the DO platoon covered was far greater than any 
other infantry platoon had ever controlled in the past.  
During an interview on 19 July 2006, the DO Platoon 
Commander from 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines stated that “I 
was assigned by one of their Company Commanders – sort of 
an AOR and it was about three clicks by one click and so I 
just gave every Squad a one click by one click area…” on 
another mission, the platoon “had a huge area with about 
six clicks of road to protect from IED emplacement and we 
were spread out quite a bit.  We were able to be spread out 
higher than 500 meters…” and cover the entire six clicks.24 
 As a result the DO Platoon and the DO concept received 
high reviews for its lethality and extreme adaptability.  
According to MCWL brief to MajGen Natonski, the Commanding 
General, 1st Marine Division, the DO Platoon from 1st 
Battalion, 3rd Marine Regiment was able to execute numerous 
missions to exacting specifications: 
On 25 Jan 06, the DO Platoon conducted a foot 
mobile security patrol along high ground SE of 
the base camp.  During the course of this patrol, 
a friendly convoy was attacked by IED, heavy 
small arms, and mortars.  The convoy commander 
was unable to maintain communications with the 
COC or indirect fire agencies.  The DO Platoon 
initially relayed all communications (calls for 
fire, SITREPs, CASREPs etc.).  Ultimately, the DO 
Platoon Commander (trained and qualified as a 
JTAC during LOE-1) took control of close air                      24 Carl Desantis (Platoon Commander, DO Platoon, 1st battalion, 3rd 
Marines) Interview by Mr. Peter Dotto, Marine Corps Center For Lessons 
Learned, Jul 19, 2006. 
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support and coordinated MEDEVAC.  It should be 
noted that the "DO communications suite" at the 
platoon headquarters facilitated his ability to 
do this. 
On 25 Feb 06, several observation posts from the 
DO Platoon were able to provide azimuths to a 
source of enemy fire.  The DO Platoon CP 
triangulated the data and called in an effective 
fire mission.  Tactical land navigation was a key 
ingredient of SUET. During the course of this 
incident, intra-platoon communications was 
disciplined and effective using the PRR, allowing 
units to share situational awareness in a timely 
fashion. 25  
 During combat operations in the Korengal Valley 
outside Jalalabad, Non-commissioned Officers (NCO) and 
junior officers of the DO Platoons skillfully executed 
operations that were normally the responsibility of more 
senior Marines.  Until recently, the delivery of Close Air 
Support (CAS) ordnance was commonly authorized by a Marine 
Aviator serving as a Forward Air Controller (FAC).  The FAC 
serves with dismounted infantry units within his parent 
battalion.  Within the DO concept, a Lance Corporal or 
Corporal theoretically would be able to properly and 
lethally employ close air support to defeat enemy forces 
within his fire team battle space.  This is accomplished by 
exacting training and the pushing of technology down to the 
Marines in the trenches. 
 The ability of 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines DO Platoon 
to have numerous decentralized teams led by highly trained 
and “wired” Marines that were operating within a non-linear 
battlefield validated the current vision of DO concept.  
                     25 Carl Desantis (Platoon Commander, DO Platoon, 1st battalion, 3rd 
Marines) Interview by Mr. Peter Dotto, Marine Corps Center For Lessons 
Learned, Jul 19, 2006. 
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Simply translated, DO means that skilled and technically 
apt NCOs and above will be required to execute missions and 
skill sets that have historically been the responsibilities 
of company grade officers and above. 
D. DOCTRINAL DISTRIBUTED OPERATIONS DEFINED 
1. Historical Context 
 Throughout the documented history of armed conflict, 
the linear and hierarchical organization of infantry units 
has remained largely unchanged.  Roman leaders utilized 
linearly organized armies against the Gauls in 295 BC and 
for the subsequent two-hundred and thirty years.  In 65 BC 
the Roman army drastically reorganized their field armies 
following the battle of Marius in order to maintain the 
Roman army as the preeminent military force in the world. 
Linear combat using tactics similar to those depicted 
in Figures 2 and 3 have been utilized to defeat an 
adversary for centuries and are considered historically 
validated combat techniques.  These designs were 
established as doctrine and were continuously reutilized 
and modified by countless subsequent armies to provide 
leaders with the greatest and most lethal tactics needed to 




Figure 2.   Frontal Attack26 
 
Figure 3.   Flanking Attack27 
 
In the early 16th Century, Napoleon Bonaparte mastered 
the use of a hierarchical organization and managed to 
achieve an unprecedented level of command, control and 
oversight of his huge army, but Napoleon’s enemies did not 
evolve as rapidly as his army did.  As a result, little 
change was required and for hundreds of years a status quo 
remained within the infantry organizational structure.  
Similarly, the United States Marine Corps (USMC) has 
continued to conduct offensive operations using linearly 
                     26 Naval Postgraduate School, Nov 7, 2006, lecture, “Offensive 
Operations:  Warfighting from the Sea (MAGTF Operations)”, slide 6 of 
PowerPoint brief.  
27 Ibid, slide 7 of PowerPoint brief. 
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organized combat platoons and squads that closely resemble 
Figure 4 from its inception in 1775 to as recently as the 
2003 invasion of Iraq.   
 
Figure 4.   An infantry platoon organized into three squad-
sized maneuver elements28  
 
2. New Organizational Concepts 
As discussed in earlier paragraphs, the doctrine 
employed by today’s military leaders has remained largely 
unchanged in form and function even though the enemy and 
the battlefields have changed immensely.  Currently, the 
vast majority of friendly forces are conducting daily 
combat operations with only a slight deviation from the 
traditional organizational structure used during the 
campaigns of World War II.  With little deviation, the USMC 
continues to operate on the modern non-linear battlefield 
utilizing tactics that are best suited to a very linear 
battle.  Figure 5 illustrates the chain network which is 
the most common structure of the conventional units 
operating abroad.  This restrictive structure is extremely 
linear and often slow to respond to emerging threats.  
While operating with this standard hierarchical 
organization, friendly forces cannot effectively counter 
the enemies’ well dispersed and decentralized structure.   
                     28 FMFM 6-5, Marine Rifle Squad, (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1991), pp.1-3. 
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Figure 5.   Chain Network29 
 
The chain network is a restrictive structure best 
utilized when the threats are linear and the force is of a 
centralized nature.  This network is vulnerable because of 
its inability to adapt and respond to emerging threats.  
While operating within this standard hierarchical 
organization, friendly forces cannot effectively counter 
the enemies’ well dispersed and decentralized structure.  
Because of the restrictive nature of this network, friendly 
forces often find themselves overloaded with information 
and too often unsure what to do with it.  Additionally, 
with an inability to properly disseminate information, 
members of this network can often only function under the 
last given order provided by their leader.  The ability to 
operate in absence of orders on a decentralized battlefield 
is not an inherent weakness, but rather it is a skill set 
that should be embraced.  The rigid chain network is no 
longer conducive to the modern battlefield and contains 
numerous limitations that must be addressed in order to 
facilitate success in modern war. 
                     29 Naval Postgraduate School Brief, Nov 20, 2006, lecture, Technology 
Change and Networks, dated 3 November 2003, slide 9 of PowerPoint brief 
by Deborah Gibbons. 
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It is widely understood that the structure 
conventional forces face on a daily basis is similar to the 
all channel model or the hub and spoke design.  Figure 6 
shows the communication and control coordination structures 
used by non-conventional enemies such as the Irish 
Republican Army (IRA), Viet-Cong, and the National 
Liberation Front (FLN), comprising a hybrid command network 
which enables their high-level of flexibility and 
adaptability.  The self-synchronizing and self-healing 
networks in use today by coalition adversaries are not a 
new design or a new concept.  Quite the contrary, these 
networks have been employed by countless opposition forces 
attempting to gain leverage against the hierarchical and 
linear networks used by conventional US Military forces 
like the USMC.  
 
 
Figure 6.   All Channel Network30 
 
                     30 Naval Postgraduate School Brief, Nov 20, 2006, lecture, Technology 
Change and Networks, dated 3 November 2003, slide 9 of PowerPoint brief 
by Deborah Gibbons. 
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3. Paradigm Shift 
Distributed Operations (DO) emerged as a response of 
the Marine Corps initiative to shift the way in which it 
will fight future conflicts. Taking the notion of small 
unit maneuver warfare to a natural conclusion, DO attempts 
to address non-linear warfare by utilizing a robust command 
and control communications architecture in remote, even 
disparate localities, taking advantage of the autonomy 
provided  each platoon and emphasizing dispersion and 
independence in their highly trained leadership. 
The baseline concept of DO is the ability to maximize 
the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) commander’s 
ability to employ tactical units across the depth and 
breadth of a non-linear battlespace in order to achieve 
favorable intelligence-driven engagements as part of the 
Joint Force Commander’s overall campaign31. 
4. DO Communications Requirements 
 The non-linear nature of the Distributed Operations 
(DO) concept requires a refocusing of the task requirements 
for USMC ground operating forces including vital functional 
areas like Command, Control, Communications, Computers, 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR), 
Maneuver and Fires (M & F), Logistics and Force Protection 
(L & FP), and Human Performance, Training and Education 
(HPT&E). 
 Command and Control within a traditional infantry 
platoon is extremely centralized.  The DO concept intends 
                     31 Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, Project Sea Viking 06, webpage, 
Questions and Answers About Distributed Operations, dated 20 March 2005 
<http://www.mcwl.usmc.mil/SV/DO%20FAQ%2016%20Mar%2005.pdf> 
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to introduce a much more fluid and decentralized 
architecture that allows the small unit leader to take 
independent actions in absence of information from his 
superior based on what is happening to his unit at that 
exact time. 
 The tactical control and maneuver of infantry 
operations within a traditional infantry platoon is 
normally orchestrated by either a mid-level squad leader or 
platoon sergeant based on the guidance of the platoon 
commander.  As a result, maneuver and tactical actions can 
often times be disseminated in a very specific and exacting 
manner from leader to subordinate.  Due to the distributed 
nature of the DO concept, the ability to control the 
maneuver of a small unit must be disseminated to the lowest 
level possible to ensure exploitation of opportunities. 
 For the DO concept to succeed, maneuver must be 
conducted in concert with fires.  Traditionally, fires are 
controlled by the platoon commander and on occasion a mid-
level squad leader, and are often extremely bottlenecked at 
the higher headquarters making them unresponsive.  The fire 
support plan is generated in advance and pushed down to the 
mid-level leader for use when the resource becomes 
necessary.  As described before within the DO concept M & F 
must be executed in concert, therefore requiring the junior 
leader be able to safely conduct fires (indirect or direct) 
within a decentralized DO structure.  This means that fires 
must be available from non-organic units at his command, 
therefore requiring bottom up fire support.   
 The resupply of expended ammunition, food, or water 
across a dispersed battle field will remain one of the most 
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demanding challenges of the DO concept.  Logistics and 
Force Protection (L & FP) must follow along a very similar 
path as M & F.  L & FP will force leaders and planners to 
transition from top-down logistical approach to a bottom-up 
approach if the dispersed force is to remain effective.   
 Lastly is the need for increased Human Performance, 
Training and Education (HPT & E).  HPT & E is crucial for 
the success of this concept.  The ability to survive on 
energy producing sustenance is one thing, but the ability 
for a junior leader (19 to 20 year old) to be capable of 
coordinating fires with maneuver and re-supply is an 
impressive theory.  The leader will have to attend numerous 
training and education institutions, to meet the rigors of 
his promotion to team leader.  HPT & E must remain in tune 
with the organizational change. 
5. More Equipment Does Not Solve the Problem 
With each new technology that comes along, commanders 
are quick to see it as a solution to the problem of limited 
spectrum availability or limited bandwidth.  This is a 
flawed but understandable mentality given that no true plan 
on where the Department of Defense is headed with respect 
to long-term communications and data transmission exists.  
What develops is an excess of radios, but no way to talk to 
the platoon three kilometers away because the net is 
inundated.  The typical solution is simply to add more 
radios to the mix, and the dog continues to chase its tail. 
Not realizing that a solution is close at hand, most 
combatant commanders will continue with the standard model 
until given reason to change. 
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Enter satellite communications (SATCOM).  SATCOM has 
been around since Sputnik began to beep from orbit in 1957.  
The ensuing space race has brought us marvelous new 
constellations of artificial stars that stream data around 
the globe, providing tele-communications 24/7.  Humans have 
responded by wanting more, but there is only so much to go 
around.   
There are several issues with satellite 
communications.  First, satellites are expensive to build 
and put on orbit.  Second, once they are built, maintenance 
is virtually impossible (the Space Shuttle not 
withstanding).  Third, the technology of the satellite 
stops upon launch, meaning you cannot upgrade to bigger, 
better satellites, you must replace them.  These older 
systems are what are being using to try and meet the ever-
increasing demands of commanders around the world. 
The age old altruism that need always exceeds capacity 
is never more true than today; tactical networks are 
becoming overburdened with an ever-increasing number of 
users and applications as the need for information grows 
faster than the networks can provide.  “At the peak of [OIF 
I], DISA claimed that 3 Gbps of satellite bandwidth was 
being provided to the theater,… 30 times the bandwidth made 
available during Desert Storm.”32  A typical satellite 
connection to a Standardized Tactical Entry Point (STEP) is 
1024 kbps.  This is multiplexed to provide Defense 
                     32Joe Leland and Isaac Porche III, Future Army Bandwidth Needs and 
Capabilities, (RAND, 2004) p.11.   
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Information System Network (DISN) services33 to many 
tactical users.  After being distributed into separate 
services, the data networks only receive a portion of the 
bandwidth, typically less than 384 kbps.  To illustrate the 
issue with this, one need imagine the problem of watering 
an entire herd of horses from a garden hose.  In addition, 
due to the adverse effects that high bit errors and latency 
associated with satellite transmissions cause for TCP 
(Transmission Control Protocol), actual traffic throughput 
capability is even less than the allotted bandwidth.  
Bandwidth is the limiting factor. 
E. PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT BANDWIDTH REQUIREMENTS 
 The overarching issue of growing requirements has not 
fallen on deaf ears and senior leadership is addressing the 
problem almost daily.  They are attempting to bridge the 
old world with the new by introducing various COTS 
solutions and technologies, leasing more bandwidth on 
commercial SATCOM, or even utilizing various WAN 
acceleration products.  However, due to proprietary 
constraints, most of these acceleration devices are 
incompatible with other commercial products causing 
interoperability issues when disparate units purchase 
different optimization solutions.  During OIF I, MARCENT 
purchased SkyX accelerators to establish an Intel link 
between 3rd Marine Air Wing and  1st Marine Expeditionary 
                     33 DISN services normally extended to the Division COC include: 
 Digital Trunk Group (DTG) for secure and non-secure telephone 
service from the Defense Switched Network (DSN), Secure Internet 
Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) and Unclassified but Sensitive 
Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET), and Video Teleconference 
(VTC). 
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Force (I MEF) 34, the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) 
purchased Expand accelerators, and the STEP sites 
implemented the ComTech Turbo IP Accelerators (I MEF also 
had Expand Accelerators).  Each of these products used 
different protocols at that time, which were not 
interoperable and limited to internal point to point links 
with devices produced by the same manufacturer on each end.  
Despite significant performance increases observed on 
internal links, links to adjacent units, Joint Task Force 
(JTF) elements, and the STEPs remained congested due to 
incompatible proprietary standards.  A unified architecture 
and uniform protocol would resolve these very germane 
conflicts, which is the salient point of this thesis.   
 Another solution to increasing bandwidth, which is all 
too often the solution first opted for, is to simply buy 
more, which has proven to be inordinately expensive.  There 
is only so much commercial space available, and the 
commercial satellite industry’s interests are not always 
the same as ours.  Additionally, the very nature of DO puts 
them well beyond the range of standard communications where 
the only reachback is satellite telephones such as the 
Iridium or Support Wide Area Network (SWAN). 
 During a 2006 Distributed Operations Architecture 
Study (DOAS) conducted by Defense Advance Research Project 
Agency (DARPA) it was determined that “[t]he assessment 
found that the near-term USMC platoon legacy communications 
technology cannot support the requirements estimated for 
MANET because the DO unit operating in a Net-centic 
environment has a very large aggregated message generation 
                     34 LtCol Mark Bryant, “FW: Request For Information,” Oct 13, 2004, 
personal email (Aug 28, 2007). 
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rate (on the order of 250,000 bps).  Similarly, the 
Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS) and 
Single-Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) 
are not adequate to the message generation rate 
requirements.  EPLRS will satisfy point-to-point 
requirements, but cannot do so when used as the 
communications backbone.” 35   This is where the authors 
believe the US Army and US Marine Corps’ communications 
architectures make their point of demarcation.   
 The Army had developed the Land Warrior System to meet 
their paradigm of the individual soldier as a system based 
on the use EPLRS as the C2 backbone; although the US Army 
recently cancelled the Land Warrior System, 36  the 4th 
Stryker Brigade Combat Team deployed to Iraq with this 
inadequate system.  The Marine Corps for their part has 
identified this weakness (EPLRS as the backbone for a C2 
system), but as yet has not identified a viable solution.  
The authors submit that an IP-based communication suite 
will provide the most robust and feasible answer to this 
problem.  Furthermore, DOAS has specifically addressed the 
inherent weakness of EPLRS system as a C2 system. 
Grouping Platoon Commander and the Squad Leader 
nodes into a series of local area networks 
reduced maximum nodal loads.  However, even with 
this reduced load, the near-term USMC Distributed 
Operations platoon legacy communication 
technology is not adequate for the estimated 
requirements.  As before, EPLRS (as backbone to 
                     35 DARPA, Distributed Operations Architecture Study (DOAS) (DARPA, 
2006), p.21. 
36 Stryker Brigade News, Aug 29, 2007, 
<www.strykernews.com/archieves/2007/02/07/land_warrior_fu.html> (last 
accessed Aug 28, 2007) 
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the network) and SINCGRS are not adequate for the 
message generation rate requirements. 37 
F. A BASELINE EXAMPLE 
In order to demonstrate the issues that the Marine 
Corps is facing with regard to what is being discussed, the 
authors propose a generic model of a Distributed Operations 
(DO) platoon. The authors will establish a baseline or “as 
is” condition based upon current constructs and 
communications protocols, illustrate the difficulties faced 
when operating in a distributed environment and still 
trying to remain linked to the networks, and then present 
an alternative solution that capitalizes on current 
technologies, provides for expansion, retains clear voice 
communications, and introduces data into the networks for 
such things as maps and biometric files, and video feeds. 
Building upon already proven technologies and research 
conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School, as well as 
commercial endeavors, the authors will construct an 
improved DO platoon enabled to conduct operations 
unambiguously, able to feed data to adjacent and higher 
units, keep constant location updates, and provide raw 
video to decision makers at all levels. 
 The following scenario was derived from requirements 
provided in the MCWL “Distributed Operations 2006 
Capabilities and Enhancement Report” and “Questions and 
Answers about Distributed Operations” and will be used to 
details shortfalls of the current communication system. 
 
                     37 DARPA, Distributed Operations Architecture Study (DOAS) (DARPA, 
2006), p.22. 
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0330 14 October, after pre-combat checks, a platoon-
sized unit departs and travels west out of Al Haqlaniyah in 
the Anbar province of Iraq enroute to checkpoint Buick, 60 
miles away.  From there, the platoon begins its movement to 
Khutaylah, 22 miles further north across harsh terrain, and 
only five miles from the Syrian border.  This will be their 
forward operating base as they conduct both mounted and 
dismounted Distributed Operations in gaps between border 
forts along the Iraq/Syrian border that have allowed 
smuggling over the past years.  Their mission is to conduct 
patrols along the border the Iraqi Border to prevent the 
movement of insurgents into Al Anbar from the Syrian 
frontier.  They will be linking up with their sister 
platoon within the next 72-96 hours.  Contact with enemy 
fighters is not expected, but always a possibility.  
Communications between the deployed platoon and both the 
company headquarters and MEU Headquarters will be 
maintained continuously. 
0630 14 October, once the DO platoon occupies an 
abandoned building well outside Khutaylah, the platoon 
begins to improve its communications links with the company 
headquarters and MEU Headquarters.  Utilizing the ETCS, 
(additionally, each squad will have in its complement, the 
PRC-117 UHF/VHF as primary or PRC-150 HF as secondary) the 
platoon radioman and the appointed radioman from each squad 
transmits back to both headquarters to indicate that they 
have established a operating base and beginning operations 
in zone.  Through the platoon’s EPLRS system, they will 
also update the Position Location Information (PLI) for 
each maneuver element and command element.  
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0700 14 October, after the DO platoon arrived in zone, 
they are advised that their frequency sets conflict with 
adjacent units along the border and that they must shift 
frequencies in order to avoid cross talk.  The radio checks 
begin and are accomplished quickly thanks to the unit 
currently being largely co-located.  The Platoon Commander 
(PC) confirms to company headquarters that he has solid 
communications via PRC-148 with each squad of the DO 
platoon.  Below the squad level, radio checks are 
accomplished through the use of the Personal Role Radios 
(PRR) that each member is equipped with.  PRR’s enable 
short range communications between members and their 
frequencies tend to not affect the adjacent units in zone.  
 Due to the frontage that must be covered, and the 
scalability of theses units, the DO platoon reorganizes 
itself based on METT-T into two distinct teams.  Team A, 
under the charge of the Platoon Commander (PC), will 
consist of two squad sized elements.  Team B, under the 
command of the Platoon Sergeant (PS), will also consist of 
approximately two squad sized elements.   
Once departed, Team B would consist of two squads 
which will operate autonomously away from the PC and under 
the command of the Platoon Sergeant (PS).  The remaining 
two squads, Team A, will stay closer to the operating base 
under the control of the PC.  Both Team A & B would remain 
well outside of supporting fires, meaning that they are 
basically reliant on the use of on call aviation assets.  
Each member is trained in call for fire and terminal 
control for close air support (CAS), but the DO platoon is 
not guaranteed those assets.  Each maneuver element is 
equipped with a modified HMMWV called the Internally 
 35
Transportable Vehicles (ITV) from which they base their 
patrols.  Radio communications equipment is kept in these 
vehicles until such time as the platoon goes foot-mobile.  
The PRC-117 and PRC-150 are typically rack mounted in the 
vehicle due to weight and power requirements but can be 
man-portable for limited duration. 
The complement of radios and their primary role for 
each DO platoon is listed in Table 1. 
 
 










                     38 Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, DO 2006 Capabilities and 
Enhancements Report, Jan 19, 2005, p.3. 
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The complete Table of Equipment (T/E) would be: 
PRR:44 (Officer: 1, Corpsman: 1, Enlisted: 42) 
PRC-148:11 (3 per squad and 1 per command group) 
ETCS:5 (1 per squad and 1 per command group) 
PRC-117: 5 (1 per squad and 1 per command group) 
PRC-119: 5 (1 per squad and 1 per command group: 
alternative to PRC-117) 
PRC-150: 1 (command group “A”) 
 
The overall platoon complement of radios is a combined 
total of 71 radio sets per platoon. 
  
0800 14 October, after numerous attempts, successful 
radio checks and validation of PLI is accomplished and the 
unit begins its movement further west.  The DO platoon’s 
mission duration is estimated to be five days and they are 
expected to establish contact with local inhabitants and to 
develop a network of contacts in hopes of receiving 
additional information while the platoon is conducting 
operations. 
2030 15 October, after 36 hours in zone, the two DO 
platoon’s teams are dispersed and positioned along an 
extended frontage in order to observe as much battlespace 
as possible.  At this time Team B observes two groups of 
armed men in pickup trucks moving towards the village of 
Khutaylah from the west.  Additionally, the team reports 
their position has not been compromised and they will 
continue to observe from their observation position.  The 
team reports this information to the PC via situation 
report (SITREP).  Based on Rules of Engagement (ROE), the 
DO platoons have authority to engage suspected insurgents 
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based on the complement of weapons reported to the PC and 
as a result of the team’s SITREP report, the PC initiates a 
call for CAS to engage the building where the two groups 
have take refuge. 
2045 15 October, the PC submits request for CAS along 
the TACC using the ETCS.  After mutual authentication, the 
request is forwarded to the TAOC, the DASC, and finally to 
the TACP.  The underlying precept is “silence is consent” 
meaning the mission will proceed unless specifically 
denied.  Al Asad airbase launches a section of AV-8B’s to 
support the call and, 20 minutes later, the Harriers are 
overhead.  Now, the PC switches to his PRC-117 to 
coordinate with the FAC(A) and direct the strike. 
 Once the 9-line is relayed to the section, the 
Harriers commence their run.  A total of 50 minutes has 
passed since the initial call from the team.  As final 
preparations for the strike are completed, the two teams of 
insurgents begin to move out of their location.  The first 
truck speeds west towards Khutaylah and the platoon’s 
operating base, while the second is delayed due to 
vehicular issues.  While the insurgents are working to 
repair the vehicle, the first BLU-126/B hits the building 
and destroys the structure, damages the vehicle and the 
scatters the remaining insurgents. 
2200 15 October, the section of Harriers receive a 
priority CAS mission from the DASC and immediately depart 
the sector to support a more critical mission.  Since Team 
B has maintained observation of the insurgents through the 
use of NVG, the final task of destroying the target is 
tasked to the Marines of Team B, while the task of 
destroying the remaining vehicle falls to the PC and Team 
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A.  The PS finalizes the coordination required to execute 
an assault on the remaining insurgents.  Switching to his 
PRC-148, the PS verifies the receipt of his mission and 
acknowledges that PC and Team A will engage the escaping 
truck. 
2215 15 October, the PS, alternating between his PRC-
148 and PRR, directs the PC onto the rapidly moving vehicle 
while he finalizes the forthcoming assault on the remaining 
insurgents in the building.  Based on traffic sent via PRC-
148, the PC initializes a hasty ambush, and directs the 1st 
squad to set up on the far side of the road and engage when 
the truck is in sight.  The 2nd squad is to stay on the near 
side and support 1st squad when the insurgents dismount.   
Concurrent with the PC planning, the PS and Team B 
begin their assault on the remaining insurgents who have 
taken up a defensive position in a structure adjacent to 
the destroyed building.  Team B, utilizing its 3rd squad as 
a support by fire position and its 4th squad as an assault 
unit, begins its attack on the insurgents held up in the 
smaller structure.  The PS would travel with the assault 
element and ensure the lead trace reporting of the 
assaulting unit to the support by fire position.  
Unfortunately, as the 4th squad began its assualt, the PS 
PRR malfunctioned.  There was ineffective reporting as a 
result of this malfunction, but the PS and the 4th squad 
leader were able to rely on the secondary lead trace signal 
which was based on IR flashes.  Besides this malfunction, 
the Team B’s assault was successful.  The insurgents were 
killed and an enormous amount of intelligence was collected 
from the destroyed building, truck and from the neutralized 
insurgents. 
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 Concurrent with Team B actions, Team A engages the 
vehicles and the insurgents which were heading toward 
Khutaylah.  After being engaged, the insurgent come to a 
halt just west of the ambush site, immediately firing in 
the direction of 1st squad.  Communication traffic over the 
PRC-148 is saturated and Marines have to rely upon training 
to work through the fog of war, but even with NVG’s, it is 
difficult to discern good guys from bad.  A team from 2nd 
squad identifies an opportunity to establish a support by 
fire position and dashes across the road to support 1st 
squad.  However, 1st squad is unaware of 2nd squad’s efforts 
and witnesses an unknown group of armed men moving across 
the road toward their location.  1st squad then reports that 
the unidentified men have begun firing on members of 2nd 
squad. 
 Not knowing where the incoming fire initiated, 1st 
squad takes cover in a ditch on the side of the road and 
after a short check of his squad reports no injuries.  1st 
squad leader calls the PC on their PRC-148 to report their 
situation.  After a great deal of communication via the 
PRC-148’s the two maneuver elements of Team A are able to 
identify each other and their locations.  The teams are 
able to locate one another through the use of near and far 
recognition signals and eventually link up and coordinate 
their fight against the remaining insurgents, neutralizing 
them and moving in to collect intelligence. 
0245 17 October, after a few hours of site 
exploitation and intelligence gathering, both Team A & B 
were able to back brief the PC in great enough detail to 
enable him to submit a finalized report to his company 
headquarters.  After a great deal of SITREPs and updates, 
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the platoon was ordered to new observation positions and 
ordered to continue patrolling.  Team A and the PC remained 
tied into the structure of the former border fort, while 
Team B pushed back out to an overwatch position well out of 
sight of the town and away from the previous compromised 
observation site.  
2200 17 October, Team A is nearing completion of their 
patrol when it is tasked to conduct a physical link up with 
a DO platoon who would be patrolling to the northeast and 
adjacent for the forthcoming days.  Mission orders released 
prior to crossing the Line of Departure (LOD) indicate the 
frequencies the second platoon can be contacted on, but as 
a result of the communication complications earlier in the 
operation the PC is required to first utilize the ETCS  to 
establish contact and pass the adjusted frequencies and 
coordinates.   
 Unfortunately, the second DO platoon has had problems 
with their ETCS and is unable to be contacted; instead they 
utilize the PRC-150 to communicate with their company 
headquarters in an attempt to relay to first platoon their 
communications situation.  After more than 60 minutes with 
no success and finally receiving updated intelligence from 
the MEU headquarters about the frequency issues from 
earlier in the patrol.  At this time the second DO platoon 
switches back to the PRC-117, and with the updated 
frequencies tries again to reach the first DO platoon.  
After 15 more minutes, the platoons successfully contact 
one another and establish a rendezvous site and time. 
Conclusion: The scenario given above highlights the 
limitations faced by DO platoons conducting operations.  
With 71 radio sets, the Marines are encumbered with nearly 
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twice as many units as needed.  Having to continually 
switch radio sets to communicate within the platoon has the 
potential to breed confusion.  A 44 man platoon needs 44 
radios that work in unison.  Additionally, it is clear to 
the authors that the training, initiative and skills of a 
DO company and various DO platoons would often time prevent 
such freshman errors (i.e. inaccurate communication, 
frequencies, movement without coordination, or redundant 
communication during the assault) from occurring at all, 
but attention to these potential errors needs to be 
identified as concerns which must be addressed for future 
combat operations. 
G. NEED FOR CHANGE 
 In order for the Marine Corps to accomplish this long 
range vision, the flow of information in lateral and 
vertical pipes must be unparalleled in history.  
Unfortunately, this means better communications.  Better 
communications means better radios.  The authors assert 
that until the USMC identifies and equips its DO units with 
emerging technological assets that can provide an 
integrated system for communicating, reporting, and 
friendly force identification and are functional within the 
NCW concept, the Marine Corps will continue to fall short 
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III. MESH NETWORKS AND DISTRIBUTED OPERATIONS 
A. INTRODUCING A WIRELESS SOLUTION 
 The proposed DO organization, as depicted in Figure 7, 
gives a snapshot of the platoon as conceived by the Marine 
Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL)  and is representative 
of the generic model utilized by the authors in 
demonstrating the “as-is” and “to-be” transition of legacy 
and new communication technologies. 
 
Figure 7.   DO Platoon Structure39 
                      39 Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, DO 2006 Capabilities and 
Enhancements Report, Jan 19, 2005, p.2. 
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 Figure 8 presents the MCWL concept of how the DO 
platoons and squads will communicate with one another. 
Utilizing the concept of mesh, each squad acts as a 
representative node within the mesh construct able to 
communicate with adjacent nodes/squads, ultimately able to 
communicate with platoon headquarters. This framework can 
be abstracted up to company, battalion, regiment, and even 
division headquarters with each Major Subordinate Command 
(MSC) being a node within the mesh architecture. 
 
 
Figure 8.   DO Communications Abstract40 
 
 
 At issue, and the primary purpose for this thesis, is 
to explore the feasibility of fielding communications 
devices to DO units that provide reachback to higher 
headquarters and ultimately the GIG; devices that enable a 
                     40 Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, DO 2006 Capabilities and 
Enhancements Report, Jan 19, 2005, p.2. 
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range of functions ranging from basic voice communications, 
to text messaging, file sharing, and video feeds, as well 
as other crucial applications that enable the warfighter to 
see the battlefield as never before. 
 The communications architecture for DO platoons 
consists of COTS and Government of the Shelf (GOTS) radio 
sets that were previously only available to battalion and 
regimental units.  The current radio sets are listed in 
Chapter II and will not be re-enumerated, however, Figure 9 
will provide a visual to enhance the concept. 
 Figure 9 provides a high-level view of the multi-asset 
approach needed to communicate at the various levels, from 
the MEU to the platoon, from the command group to the 





Figure 9.   DO Communications Architecture41 
 
 The Figures 10 and 11 display the distribution of 






                     41 Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, DO 2006 Capabilities and 




Figure 10.   Command Communications Distribution42 
 
 
Figure 11.   Squad Communications Distribution43 
                     42 Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, DO 2006 Capabilities and 
Enhancements Report, Jan 19, 2005, p.2. 
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B. REORGANIZATION OF COMMUNICATION FLOW 
Figure 12 provides a schematic of how a reorganized 
communications suite would potentially be constructed with 
the new communications paradigm for DO platoons.  The 
casual observer would notice that it follows the 
traditional command structure as far as bridging from one 
subnet to the next, the differences will be made clear in 
Chapter IV when the authors propose how to establish a 
preliminary architecture for this innovative unit.  The 
authors introduce this decomposition here to simply 
illuminate the salient differences between the current 
methodology and their vision for the future communications 
architecture, yet to be built. 
 
Figure 12.   Proposed DO Communications Architecture 
 
 
                     
 
43 Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, DO 2006 Capabilities and 
Enhancements Report, Jan 19, 2005, p.3. 
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C. WIRELESS MESH DEFINED 
A mesh network is an extension of the traditional 
wireless network (Figure 13) which typically consists of a 
router that is physically connected to a larger network or 
the internet, and a Wireless Access Point (WAP) that in 
turn communicates to several devices.  This configuration 
is also termed the Basic Service Set (BSS).  The limitation 
of the BSS is that the WAP has a limited range, typically 
100 meters (802.11 protocol) and can handle a maximum load 
of 30 users at any one time (802.11 protocol)44.  
 
Figure 13.   Basic Service Set 
 
 Building upon the BSS is the Extended Service Set 
(ESS) which is a set of two or more interconnected BSSs and 
integrated local area networks (LANs) that appear as a 
single BSS to the user (Figure 14). This configuration 
allows the user to be relatively mobile; once association                      44 INTEL Corp., Understanding Wi-Fi and WiMax as metro access 
solutions, WiFi and WiMAX Solutions, (INTEL Corp: San Jose, 2004), p.7. 
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to the network is established, a user may freely roam 
between WAPs and still remain connected to the network 
unless he moves outside of the range of any WAP on the LAN. 
 
 
Figure 14.   Extended Service Set 
 
In contrast to the traditional configuration, a 
Wireless Mesh Network (WMN) is a network of independent 
nodes that function as routers, sending and receiving 
messages, and relaying messages to its neighbors. The 
relaying characteristic enables each node to provide a 
multi-hop routing capability which introduces a possible 




Figure 15.   Basic Mesh Network 
 
D. PROS AND CONS OF WIRELESS MESH 
 This configuration would appear to be the answer to a 
tactical scenario, and it is, until the limited range of 
the wireless network cards (typically PCMCIA or 
integrated)is factored, as well as the limitations of 
802.11 type cards that have difficulty transmitting through 
buildings, trees, hills, vehicles, or other such 
obstructions typically found in a combat environment. The 
authors will discuss the benefits and drawbacks of the 
wireless mesh network as well as some of the difficulties 




1. Benefits of 802.11 and 802.16 Technologies in a 
 Mesh Network 
a. Self-forming 
Nodes within a mesh network have the inherent 
capability of discovering neighboring nodes in a couple of 
ways depending upon the algorithm contained within their 
software, they can either continuously query for new nodes, 
or wait for a new node to request association on-demand.  
b. Physically Extends Traditional Networks 
By virtue of having an integrated wireless card, 
or inserting a PCMCIA card into a slot, a laptop or PDA is 
free to roam within the range of the mesh network, 
establishing a new connection with its closest neighbor. 
This is done transparently to the user. 
c. Peer-to-Peer Routing 
The ability of each node to route traffic and 
share information is different than client-server 
configuration and what makes up the architecture of the 
internet. Routers share information as well as routing 
tables that keep the topology of the internet healthy and 
greatly enhance the survivability of the net. This 
redundancy is one of the greatest strengths of a mesh 
network by increasing the overall availability of the 
network and giving it the ability to self-heal. Were a node 
to drop off of the net, or a link between nodes was no 
longer viable, the surrounding nodes would be able to 
detect this and compensate accordingly. 
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d. Availability 
802.11 technology is ubiquitous and inexpensive. 
Practically every modern household within the United States 
has at least one router and WAP. This makes the idea of 
constructing ad-hoc tactical networks with 802.11 
technologies very attractive. 802.16 technologies are 
emerging but are still in their infancy, the authors 
predict their availability to increase with a corresponding 
decrease in price. 
2. Drawbacks to an 802.11 Mesh Network 
a. Range 
Current 802.11 technology is limited by FCC 
regulation to transmit at a power setting that restricts 
its maximum effective range to approximately 100 meters, 
less when factoring in obstructions. This attempts to 
prevent the device from affecting, or being affected by, 
other 802.11 devices. This limitation inhibits any tactical 
usage. 
b. Security 
802.11 wireless cards are omni-directional, 
increasing both the probability of detection as well as the 
probability of intercept (POD/POI). Further, the security 
protocols established for 802.11 (WPA and WEP) have known 
vulnerabilities45 that compromise their integrity and 
effectiveness on the battlefield. 
                     45 Joel Snyder and Rodney Thayer, “WPA – An accident waiting to 
happen,” Oct 4, 2004, 
<http://www.networkworld.com/reviews/2004/1004wirelesswpa.html> (last 
accessed Aug 28, 2007) and L. Padilla, “Active WEP Cracking,” 
http://www.gae.ucm.es/~padilla/extrawork/activewepcrack.html (last 
accessed Aug 28, 2007) 
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c. Saturation 
Wireless technologies have a limit as to how many 
subscribers can be accommodated at any given time. This is 
due to having to provide equitable service to all but only 
so much time with which to do so. 802.11 subscribers 
compete for access to the WAP every time they communicate 
using CSMA to ‘hear’ other users. In an outdoor setting, 
this limits your useable subscribers to 10.46 
d. Conclusion 
The authors do not wish to tie a specific 
technology to any proposed solution, instead allowing an 
open architecture approach to solving a constantly moving 
problem. The authors research, however, has lead us to 
focusing on 802.16 as a viable option to many of the 
problems addressed above. Although 802.16 devices would 
utilize omni-directional transceivers, their security 
aspect greatly reduces the probability of exploitation47. 
The primary benefit of 802.16 is range. Though intended for 
static solutions, 802.16 is increasingly becoming popular 
for mobile users48. 
E. DISTRIBUTED OPERATION UNIT ASSUMPTIONS 
The following comprise the salient issues when dealing 
with DO units and provide boundaries with which to limit 
the scope of The authors research and allows that research 
                     46 PROXIM Corp., Wireless Outdoor Routing Protocol, Technology 
Overview, (San Jose: Proxim Corp., 2003), p.2.  
47 Rex Buddenburg, “802.16 WAN Security Issues”, unknown,  
<http://roland.grc.nasa.gov/~ivancic/RFI/responses/NavalPostgraduateSch
ool.txt> (last accessed Sep 17, 2007). 
48 “What is WIMAX?” <http://www.palowireless.com/i802_16/wimax.asp> 
(last accessed Sep 17, 2007). 
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to assist in the functional development of a practical 
solution to support the warfighter. 
1. Constraints49 
 The DO unit is built around the Marine Corps four 
man fire team. 
 Each DO team of 4 is mechanized, specifically, 
they operate a vehicle that contains a 
transmitter/receiver unit and router that 
provides for mobility across rugged terrain. Each 
vehicle maintains the capability of reachback to 
the MEU TOC as well as to other homogenous teams. 
(MCWFL has expressed that mounted operations are 
one capability and that solutions should not be 
vehicle-centric. To this end, all solutions are 
rack-mountable, which is preferable, as well as 
man-portable). 
 DO units operate outside of the coverage of 
organic fires, with the exception of air. 
 Maximum organic DO unit size is Platoon (1 
Officer, 1 Corpsman, and 42 Enlisted). 
 DO units do not intentionally conduct large urban 
operations, which is typically the job of the 
Battalion or Regiment. 
 Members will be operating in close proximity to 
one another (<100m). 
 Maximum operational time is 14 days. 
                     49 Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, Questions and Answers About 
Distributed Operations, Mar 16, 2005. 
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2. Requirements  
 Availability of 99.9889%50 (intra-platoon) 
 VOIP 
 GPS reporting 
 Nodal and/or orphan51 discovery 
 Medical emergency reporting 
3. Expected Capabilities 
 Voice 
 Constant connectivity among Marines in the unit 
 Map with GPS reporting 
 File sharing 
 Photo/Video 
 Routing of messages (Multicast, Broadcast) 
 Self-healing 
 Self-organizing (based on pre-established 
criteria) 
 Nodal/Orphan discovery 
 Expandable/Upgradable 
F. END-STATE: NETWORK-CENTRIC WARFARE 
 In addition to the need for all services to become 
interoperable and visible within the commander’s 
                     50 Naval Postgraduate School, Feb 12, 2007, lecture, 
<http://web1.nps.navy.mil/~budden/lecture.notes/availability.html>, 
(last accessed Aug 28, 2007). 
51 The term ‘orphan’ refers to a member separated from his original 
group. 
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operational picture (Figure 16), there is also a need for 
the armed services to transition the manner in which they 
will wage combat against non-nation states and an 
asymmetric enemy.  The concept of transformations of the 
armed forces was initiated to further the development of 
friendly armed forces’ ability to sustain preeminence 
against emerging non-state threats and an asymmetric enemy.  
The manner in which the armed forces fight the nation’s 
battles, as well as in the way C2 is maintained during 
those battles has been identified as a priority by the 
President of the United States (POTUS), the Secretary of 
Defense (SECDEF) and the Commandant of the Marine Corps 
(CMC). 
 
Figure 16.   Network-centric Warfare Vision52 
 
 The Marine Corps, for its part, has identified 
numerous areas in which it intends to interlink its future 
concepts under the required joint operability.  In 
                     52 Sagem Défense Sécurité, “Optronics Systems & Optics : Global 
solutions”, Network Centric Warfare/BOA, <http://www.sagem-
ds.com/eng/site.php?spage=02020603>, (last accessed Aug 30, 2007). 
 58
accordance with Joint Vision 2020 (JV2020) it has been 
conducting aggressive experimentation with Ship To 
Objective Maneuver (STOM), Operational Maneuver from the 
Sea (OMFTS), and DO to name a few (Figure 17).   
 
Figure 17.   The USMC concepts and NCW53 
 
As described above, the DoD’s long-term vision is to 
enable constant communications with the emerging GIG.  The 
Marine Corps, for their part, needs to come into alignment 
with Joint Vision 2020 by transforming their communications 
architectures to seamlessly integrate the individual Marine 
into the overarching concept that is the joint force of the 
modern battlespace. 
                     53 Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, DO 2006 Capabilities and 
Enhancements Report, Jan 19, 2005, p.3. 
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G. CONCLUSION 
 By definition, NCW is an “information superiority-
enabled concept of operations that generates increased 
combat power by networking sensors, decision makers, and 
shooters to achieve shared awareness, increased speed of 
command, higher tempo of operations, greater lethality, 
increased survivability, and a degree of self 
synchronization.  In essence, NCW translates information 
superiority into combat power by effectively linking 
knowledgeable entities in the battlespace.”54 
                     54 D.S. Alberts, J.J. Garstka, and F.P. Stein, Network Centric 
Warfare:  Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority, Department 
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IV. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
A. TACTICAL NETWORK TOPOLOGY 
In this section, the authors will demonstrate the COTS 
devices currently being fielded to small combat units by 
private industry that is attempting to build an 
architecture around their products.  The fundamental flaw 
with this approach is that they are building the system 
backwards. Instead of working from a defined DoD 
communications architecture and implementing products that 
support it, these companies have identified an implicit 
requirement and have begun to construct a system to fit 
that need.  
Numerous devices have been rigorously tested in 
experimentation that has spanned years of combined testing 
both in laboratories aboard Naval Post-graduate School as 
well as aboard Camp Roberts Army National Guard Base, near 
Paso Robles, CA, during the quarterly NPS-USSOCOM 
cooperative field experiment program. These experiments 
provide a proving ground for testing of mobile 
communications devices, software applications to improve 
situational awareness (SA) on the battlefield, and remote 
sensors such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). 
B. AVAILABLE EQUIPMENT 
The Inter-4 Tacticomp adaptable line of products are 
Wireless, VOIP, and GPS enabled computers that have been 
ruggedized for field use. The Tacticomp products offer a 
unique level of integration within a lightweight, adaptable 
and rugged design.  
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These devices, manufactured by Sierra Nevada 
Corporation (SNC), have received a great deal of attention 
and with good reason.  These devices are currently being 
fielded with numerous Army units from the small elite 
Ranger Regiments to the new Stryker Brigades.  The 
Tacticomp 5 & 6 (Figures 13 & 14) are the larger and more 
capable of the devices.  These particular computers tend to 
be vehicular mounted, but are capable for dismounted 
operation.  The Tacticomp 1.5 (Figure 15) is equally as 
rugged piece of equipment.  This reinforced PDA serves as a 
reliable and lightweight unit that can be carried by each 
dismounted Marine or soldier in a unit.   
As with most emerging technologies, there are a few 
drawbacks.  The shortfalls of this particular product line 
are not the focus of this thesis.  On the contrary, the 
authors identify this system purely to represent the 
availability of capable products within the COTS and GOTS 
procurement system.  Without question, the shortfalls of 
these devices would need extensive discussion to a level 
that exceeds this thesis. 
First and foremost is the lack of interconnectivity.  
All SNC devices can only interconnect with other (non-SNC) 
devices only through the use of an external tactical radio 
set.  Secondly, these devices are currently only 802.11 
compliant.  Modifications would have to be made to become 
802.16 compliant, the authors and numerous NPS Staff and 
Students have discussed this issue with SNC.  Lastly, the 
Tacticomp’s have proven unable to handle excessive amounts 
of traffic; specifically with regards to video.55  The 
                     55 TNT experiment August 2006 
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specifics are that each device was operating at or near 
capacity with regards to applications (chat, video, and 
voice communications) and the 400 MHz processor was unable 
to accommodate such a heavy work load, the authors will 
address this issue as a matter of proposed architecture. 
 
 
Figure 18.   INTER-4 Tacticomp 656 
 
Figure 19.   INTER-4 Tacticomp 557 
                     56 SNC Corp., INTER-4 Tacticomp Radio 6, 
<http://www.sncorp.com/prod/c4n/int4/tacticomp1.shtml> 2006, (last 
accessed Aug 30, 2007). 
57 SNC Corp., INTER-4 Tacticomp Radio 5, 
<http://www.sncorp.com/prod/c4n/int4/tacticomp1.shtml> 2006, (last 
accessed Aug 30, 2007). 
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Figure 20.   INTER-4 Tacticomp 1.558 
 
2. INTER-4 Micro Mesh Router (MMR) 
This specific Tacticomp device is utilized as an omni-
directional wireless router for separate mesh groups to 
communicate at data rates of 2 Mbps up to 12 miles.  Though 
billed as a router, the device actually works as a bridge, 
it does not perform layer 3 routing. The MMR is suitable 
for mounting on vehicles as well as man-portable. The 
practicality of the MMR is in its ability to link meshed 
groups. 
 
                     58 SNC Corp., INTER-4 Tacticomp Radio 1.5, 
<http://www.sncorp.com/prod/c4n/int4/tacticomp1.shtml> 2006, (last 
accessed Aug 30, 2007). 
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Figure 21.   INTER-4 MRR59 
 
C. C2 APPLICATIONS 
1. Command and Control Personal Computer (C2PC) 
A Windows-based application designed for MAGTF 
tactical data systems, interoperable with the Global 
Command and Control System (GCCS) already in use with the 
DoD.  
2. Command and Control Compact Edition (C2CE) 
A newer application designed for pocket PC’s that 
emulates C2PC when used by the D-DACT. 
Both of these applications are intended for the 
warfighter to have the ability to have mapping, GPS, common 
operational picture of the battlespace, a digital workspace 
to replace paper map boards and the various overlays used 
on them. Either application is suitable for use in the  
 
                     59 SNC Corp. INTER-4 Omni-directional Micro Mesh Router, 
<http://www.sncorp.com/prod/c4n/int4/odmmr.shtml> 2006, (last accessed 
Aug 30, 2007). 
 66
proposed architecture and is only intended to give examples 
of software applications that can handle the requirements 
of the DO unit.  
Some of the functionality required by DO units that 
these applications provide are Graphical Overlays such as 
Intel, COA’s, Friendly and Enemy Situational Awareness. 
They will also have the capability of Reporting, Messaging, 
and Mapping, and numerous other infantry related functions. 
D. ROUTING PROTOCOLS 
 
Table 2.   Routing Protocols60 
 
The greatest flexibility of mesh networks in any 
environment is routing. Divided into 3 major philosophies, 
routing protocols are the heart and soul of the Mobile Ad-
Hoc Network (MANET) and there are myriad proposals as to 
the best solution (see Table 2 above). Each has strengths 
and weaknesses. The most appropriate ones are listed below, 
after a brief description of the routing philosophies. 
                     60 Mattias Halvardsson and Patrik Lindbert, Reliable Group 
Communication in a Military Mobile Ad Hoc Network, Master’s Thesis, 
Vaxjo University, Feb 2004. 
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1. Proactive MANET Protocols 
Proactive protocols such as OLSR and DSDV are table-
driven and use stored values to maintain a record of nodes 
within the network. This reduces latency of data delivery 
since the route is stored and available when required, the 
down side is that a great deal of overhead is required to 
maintain the routing tables that make up the network. 
2. Reactive MANET Protocols 
Reactive protocols such as AODV and TORA determine 
routes between nodes on demand, meaning that the delivery 
route is determined when a node has information to deliver. 
This philosophy reduces the amount of communication 
overhead that is required of a table-centric proactive 
method, but can lead to possible delays between route 
request and transmission as the optimal route is 
determined. 
3. Hybrid MANET Protocols 
The last major division of routing protocols attempts 
to capture the most attractive aspects of the first two 
while simultaneously avoiding the detractors. Among these 
hybrid protocols are proposals such as Zone Routing 
Protocol (ZRP) which segments the network into zones and 
proactively establishes tables within a specific region to 
determine the best possible route for delivery. This 
protocol was proposed to the MANET working group but was 
not adopted61. 
                     61 “Zone Routing Protocol”, Wikipedia 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zone_Routing_Protocol> 
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An additional protocol that seems more suitable to the 
tactical environment is Open Shortest Path First (OSPF). 
This method is the most widely used Interior Gateway 
Protocol (IGP) for large networks and uses Dijkstra’s 
Algorithm to determine the shortest path tree with path 
cost as its routing metric. Path cost is determined by the 
speed (bandwidth) of the interface addressing the given 
route62. 
Protocols have been devised with the mobile user 
specifically in mind. Of these, Optimized Link State 
Routing (OLSR) and Ad-hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV) 
are pre-eminent. OLSR being proactive and AODV being 
reactive, they both provide contrasting benefits to the 
network. OLSR is the fastest in establishing connections, 
but is continuously discovering the network, meaning that 
it is constantly communicating with the network to keep its 
routing table updated, incurring a good deal of overhead. 
AODV, by comparison, is simpler, requires much less 
overhead, less memory, and fewer calculations, but suffers 
from greater delay. Additionally, a corresponding increase 
in communication is incurred when a new route is needed63. 
Routing protocols have a fundamental set of 
requirements that are listed below. These requirements 
dovetail into the requirements for mesh networks and have 
been the foundations for MANET. 
 
                     62 “OSPF Working Group” IETF 
<http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/ospf-charter.html> (date last 
accessed Aug 30, 2007). 
63 Dr. Don Moskaluk, “Wireless Mesh Topology”, 
<http://www.moskaluk.com/Mesh/wireless_mesh_topology.htm> Jan 2004 
(last accessed Aug 30, 2007). 
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●Self starting and self organizing 
●Multi-hop, loop-free paths 
●Dynamic topology maintenance 
●Rapid convergence 
●Minimal network traffic overhead 
●Scalable to “large” networks64 
The authors have surveyed two leading protocols for 
analysis in this thesis, one each from either end of the 
routing spectrum. OLSR comes from the pro-active camp, and 
OSPF which is a re-active routing protocol. The authors 
envision a hybrid of both but in different subnets; for 
inter-fire team), the OLSR protocol offers the better 
choice. Fire teams are well-defined in area and as such, 
are well suited for a pro-active routing protocol. 
Conversely, squads (and the platoon as a system) are far 
more diverse in area and would be better suited to a 
reactive routing protocol. Fire teams, being fewer in 
number, can afford the overhead that a pro-active protocol 
brings with it. Squads (and the platoon as a system) would 
bog down the network with the overhead of a pro-active 
protocol and thus need a reactive protocol. However, the 
authors believe it should ultimately be up to the industry 
to devise suitable protocols to fit any final solution.  
E. BENEFITS OF NCW TO THE WARFIGHTER 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff published their vision of 
the Network-Centric Operational Environment (NCOE), 
                     64 Andreas Tønnesen, “Implementing and extending the Optimized Link 
State Routing Protocol”, OLSR.org, <http://www.olsr.org/docs/master-
pres.pdf> 2004, (last accessed Aug 30, 2007). 
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outlining what they call “Full Spectrum Dominance”. 65  By 
adopting an architecture utilizing IP radios, the following 
benefits to the warfighter can be achieved, thereby 
bringing the Marine Corps into full compliance with the 
vision of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
• Efficiency—increased in terms of time, economy of 
force, and cognitive learning. Time efficiency is increased 
because ubiquitous network connectivity and good IM will 
reduce or eliminate the need to manually convert data and 
information. Also, automated machine-to-machine information 
sharing, and data translation through data services, will 
allow humans to concentrate on less mundane tasks. To 
optimize economy of force, every JTF element can call upon 
the capabilities of other JTF elements as appropriate. For 
quicker cognitive learning, KM and I-IM tools will enable 
each user to receive and focus on whatever information is 
needed, in a format tailored to best fit his/her 
professional and personal preferences. 
• Cross Functional Synergy—achieved by networking and 
synthesizing the Joint Force’s data, including the 
traditionally separate staff functions of personnel (1), 
intelligence (2), operations (3), logistics (4), and 
military civil/ international affairs (5). These cross-
connections can be leveraged to reveal new insights. For 
example, in preparing for an aerial strike mission, the 
NCOE will anticipate and retrieve essential planning 
information from known and trusted sources, augmented by 
event-driven alternate inputs. It will also provide 
                     65 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Net-Centric Operating Environment – Joint 
Integrating Concept, Oct 31, 2005, pp.35-36. 
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warnings of in-process threats to the operation, followed 
by near real-time bomb damage assessments.  
• Joint Cohesion—enhanced by promoting technical 
connectivity and IM, while KM and NM tools will spread and 
improve ever-developing knowledge of how best to conduct 
cohesive Joint Net-Centric Operations Environment (JNCOE). 
The NCOE will link every Joint Force element to help find, 
disseminate, and implement “lessons learned” throughout the 
Force, continuously. It will also leverage various Joint 
Force capabilities heretofore latent. Called constructive 
interdependence, this depends upon a high degree of mutual 
trust as the Force’s diverse members make unique 
contributions toward common objectives and rely upon each 
other for various essential capabilities instead of 
duplicating those capabilities organically (i.e., economy 
of force). The NCOE will achieve this by employing 
intelligent agents to search inventory databases and match 
requirements to individual unit capabilities. The NCOE will 
thus facilitate an almost limitless combination of Service 
and component capabilities in ways not previously 
achievable. 
• Collaboration with Mission Partners. Constructive 
interdependence is not limited to the Joint Force alone. 
The NCOE-enabled integration of mission partners via their 
networks will enable the JTF to share mission objectives, 
synchronize the operation, task-organize it for optimal 
efficiency, and enhance its effectiveness. 
• Decision Superiority—facilitated by providing every 
decision-maker with access to a wealth of relevant 
information and knowledge, including the very latest ISR 
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reports, the current operational picture, and the insights 
and advice of SMEs and/or COIs. Advanced visualization 
techniques will show unprecedented quantities of 
information, individually tailored to specific needs. 
Although the proverbial “fog and friction” of war can never 
be eliminated entirely, KM and I-IM tools will reduce its 
uncertainties and risks by promoting a higher level of 
situational awareness, further enhanced by applied 
analytical confidence factors, embedded modeling and 
simulation algorithms, and expanded knowledge sharing 
opportunities. Confidence weightings will be determined by 
a group of automated smart tools and programs designed to 
correlate data from various sources into a coherent 
information object.  
 Rapid Adaptability at the Tactical, Operational and 
Strategic levels—facilitated by the NCOE’s comprehensive 
reach throughout the Joint Force and mission partners, 
enabling the near instantaneous dissemination of 
information, knowledge, and command guidance. Commanders at 
multiple levels can “drill down” to see any aspect of the 
tactical or operational picture they desire. Vital “lessons 
learned” will be acquired rapidly, improving the JTF 
knowledge-base and ensuring that the Force becomes better 
prepared to address recurring situations. If any Force 
elements require additional training or re-training to more 
effectively counter an adversary’s asymmetric ways, various 
instructional aids will accelerate that needed training, 
such as audio-visual briefings, virtual reality simulators, 
and interactive software programs. Such training will be 
especially valuable for personnel who must perform 
 73
unexpected missions, such as artillery personnel compelled 
to perform counter-insurgency and military police missions. 
F. MATERIAL BENEFITS 
The following list of material benefits is not 
intended to be all encompassing, simply some of the more 
apparent functional items that current IP devices bring to 
the table.  
1. Voice 
Clear (No static). 
VOIP has emerged as an exceptionally reliable and 
ubiquitous service, even over Wireless Internet Service 
Providers (WISP). Such providers as Vonage, Fonality, and 
others, are providing high quality service that rivals the 
Plain Old Telephone System (POTS). 
2. Directional Communications 
 Mono Cast (1 Recipient) 
 Multi Cast (Sub net:  Squad or Team) 
 Broad Cast (Entire Platoon) 
As pointed out earlier in this thesis, push-to-talk 
radio systems are broadcast only, they cannot be directed 
to any one individual or sub-group within the larger group. 
IP radios provide an inherent capability to route packets 
to specific receivers or sub-groups. 
3. Scalable Communications Architecture 
 Capability Sets 
With limited bandwidth available to any tactical user, 
the concept of permissions becomes apparent when faced with 
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the necessities of combat. The rifleman from 1st fireteam 
does not need to same capabilities as the Squad Leader, who 
needs fewer than the Platoon Sergeant, and the Platoon 
Commander.  
The author’s have devised a permissions schema that 
addresses this and will be discussed below. 
4. Data 
 Files (overlays, orders, data) 
 Imagery 
 Bio-metrics (friend or foe) 
This is truly where the IP-based system comes into its 
own. File transfer and the ability to store and retrieve 
information provides tremendous benefit in the Network-
centric realm of the 21st century battlefield. 
5. GPS 
 PLI 
 Assists with the deconfliction of fires 
 Unambiguous 
One of the most difficult aspects of battle is knowing 
where friendly and enemy forces are at any given time. The 
DoD has made numerous attempts to reduce the fog of war by 
introducing such initiatives as Blue Force Tracker and 
EPLRS, all of which are complicated and require specialized 
equipment to operate. GPS provides a much more accurate 
location and the receivers are incorporated in some of the 




 Automated Reports 
  Logistical/Administrative Reporting 
  9 LINES (Close Air Support) 
  Call For Fire (Artillery) 
  CASEVAC 
Having the ability to automate resupply of equipment 
reduces the amount of time and effort the platoon must 
place other than conducting combat operations. Further, 
with minimal training, the average Marine can utilize 
automated calls for fire and requests for air support that 
once required trained artillery officers and/or aviators to 
be embedded with the platoon. 
7. Logistics 
 Cost (71 vs. 44 units) 
 Weight (see cost above) 
 Batteries (see cost above) 
The ancillary benefit of adopting an IP-based solution 
will be that of reducing the load that the warfighter must 
bear when conducting combat operations. A single radio set, 
vice the multitude carried currently, will be a welcome 
relief. 
G. CAPABILITY SETS 
As mentioned previously, having permissions based on 
need is a fundamental ability that will reduce the burden 
on what precious amount of bandwidth the DO platoon will 
carry into battle. It is a foregone conclusion that the 
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chain of command carries with it specific authority that 
not everyone within the confines of a military 
organizational unit will or should have.  The burden of 
command is written in stone.  
However, the need for information does not carry rank 
and any communications system adopted by the DoD should 
bear this in mind; IP-based systems are not limited to this 
structure and the system envisioned by the authors has no 
such limitation placed upon it. The Capability Sets listed 
below are merely a reflection of the chain of command for 
authority’s sake as well as the necessities of bandwidth 
limitations. 
Capability Set 1 (CS1) 
o (Basic) Routing, GPS (with pre-loaded maps for 
AOR), Capability to promote subordinate CS to same level 
(but not higher), VOIP, Limited Imagery, capability to 
sense other mesh enabled devices. 
Capability Set 2 (CS2) 
o CS1 + Limited video, improved imagery (higher 
resolution), file push (can transmit files to CS1. 9-line, 
Call for fire, Multicast. 
Capability Set 3 (CS3) 
o CS2 + Improved resolution video, Broadcast and 
Multicast. 
These permissions are introduced as a starting point, 
the users should and will be the ultimate arbiter of what 
is needed for what mission and the author’s believe that an  
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Open Architecture approach to designing these permissions 
is the best approach to finding the right solution for the 
needs of the Marine Corps and the DoD as an entire 
organization. 
In unison with the Capability Sets, the authors 
envision a component solution as well.  With the ability of 
every device to act as a router and bridging device, the 
network is strengthened by the ability of every Marine/node 
to transmit when needed.  This gives the network the needed 
flexibility and robustness that a combat situation 
dictates. This solution is being explored by INTER-4, a 
subsidiary of the Sierra Nevada Corporation. 
H. SCENARIO REVISITED 
In order to demonstrate the benefits that the Marine 
Corps would gain by replacing the legacy communication 
suite with an updated IP-based communication suite, let us 
look again at the generic model of a DO platoon that was 
viewed during Chapter II.  Instead of the platoon 
conducting combat operations with legacy communication 
equipment, let’s view the same operations after the DO 
platoon are provided with an upgraded IP-based 
communication suite.  The authors will demonstrate the 
“what if” condition based upon future constructs and 
communications protocols, illustrating the solutions 
provided by IP-based communications when operating in a 
distributed environment linked to other networks.  
Based on proven technologies and research conducted at 
the Naval Postgraduate School, as well as commercial 
endeavors, the authors have constructed an improved DO 
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platoon enabled to conduct operations unambiguously, able 
to feed data to adjacent and higher units, keep constant 
location updates, and provide raw video to decision makers 
at all levels. 
0330 14 October, after pre-combat checks, a platoon-
sized unit departs and travels west out of Al Haqlaniyah in 
the Anbar province of Iraq enroute to checkpoint Buick, 60 
miles away.  Because the DO platoon will be utilizing an 
integrated PLI/GPS system, the platoon leadership and 
higher headquarters will be able to track the movement of 
the unit via a common operating picture (COP) at the 
tactical level which easily propagates the same vision up 
to varied higher headquarters (company, battalion, or 
higher as needed).  The platoon will also be able to track 
the location of each element (down to the individual 
Marine, if required) as they travel toward checkpoint Buick 
on the COP.  The PC, controlling Team A, will also be able 
to effectively maintain command and control of both Team A 
& B as well as his particular maneuver element as they move 
toward their operation base.  If the PC wishes to split his 
forces, Team B can be tasked to travel along an alternative 
route while Team A continues on a pre-described route.   
Once at the operating base, their mission remains to 
conduct patrols along the border to prevent the movement of 
insurgents into Al Anbar from the Syrian frontier.  
Communications between the deployed platoon and both the 
company headquarters and MEU Headquarters will be 
maintained continuously. 
0630 14 October, once the DO platoon occupies an 
abandoned building well outside Khutaylah, the platoon 
 79
easily improve its communications links with the company 
headquarters and MEU Headquarters through its self-healing, 
self-forming, adaptive MANET network topology.  Utilizing a 
system similar to those discussed in Chapter IV, a 
Tacticomp 5s will be with PC & PS, while Tacticomp 1.5 will 
be with each individual Marine.  The use of an Omni-
directional Micro-mesh router and airborne routing 
equipment (UAV, balloons, dedicated or chance aircraft in 
zone) will allow long range communication from anywhere 
within the platoon.  A dedicated radioman will still be 
utilized, but each Marine in the platoon can serve as a 
router and a radioman if needed.  With this nodal topology, 
and COP, the PLI for the entire dispersed platoon can be 
easily automatically passed to all units without SITREPs.  
The platoon’s ability to maintain continuous PLI will 
assist enormously in command and control and reporting. 
0700 14 October, since the DO platoon and all adjacent 
units are all using IP-based communications, they each have 
pre-established subnet ID’s that are assigned to each piece 
of communication equipment and for the most part “never 
change.”  Therefore, the DO platoon that arrived in zone 
will not have a frequency set conflicts with adjacent 
units.  Quite the opposite will take place:  the DO platoon 
will be clearly identified within the zone and 
communication will likely approve as the adjacent units 
assist in the routing and passing of data.  The radio 
checks are continuous and clear as a result of VOIP 
technology that eliminates static entirely.  Furthermore, 
each Marine/node, including adjacent units, actually  
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improves overall communication range.  This allows 
affective communication from the individual Marine to any 
available node via one IP-based radio (i.e. Tacticomp 5 or 
1.5).  
On order from the PC, Team B under the control of the 
PS and consisting of two squads, would move to an overwatch 
position where they will operate autonomously.  As a result 
of their movement east of the town of Khutaylah, the 
platoon’s communication would likely improve as nodes 
become more and more dispersed along the platoons frontage.  
The remaining two squads, Team A, will stay closer to the 
operating base under the control of the PC.  These four 
squads, and approximately 42 nodes, would form a large 
MANET that would continuously update headquarters to their 
position as well as potentially linking up with border 
units or adjacent units using similar IP-based 
communication networks.  As a result, a topology of nodes 
along the border would allow for deconfliction of direct 
fires as well as coordination.   
Both Team A & B would remain well outside of 
supporting fires, but because of the teams ability to 
communicate over greater distances, support from adjacent 
units who maintain indirect fires, or the ability for a 
troop in contact to reach any aircraft in zone, would 
strengthen the unit without dedicated fires.  Each member 
is trained in call for fire and terminal control for close 
air support (CAS), and as a result of inter-operable, each 
Marine can coordinate such fires as needed.   
Because each additional unit within the battlespace 
(i.e., Air Force fixed wing, Naval fixed wing or Army 
rotary wing or indirect fires) are equipped and utilizing 
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the same IP-based radio communications equipment, the DO 
platoon is never off line.  Additionally, the majority of 
the IP-based equipment does not require extensive vehicular 
assets.  A small portable IP-based radio like the Tacticomp 
1.5 contains a radio, GPS, and PLI. It provides a simple 
light weight device for use during foot-mobile patrols.  
The complement of radios and their primary role for each DO 
platoon is listed in Table 3. 
 
Table 3.   Communications Equipment and Capabilities66 
 
The complete Table of Equipment (T/E) would be: 
1.5: 44 (Officer: 1, Corpsman: 1, Enlisted: 42) 
5: 1 (1 for Team B Command group) 
6: 1 (1 for Team B Command group) 
MMR: 6 (1 per squad and 1 per command group) 
 
                     66 SNC Corp., INTER-4 Tacticomp Products, 
<http://www.sncorp.com/prod/c4n/int4/default.shtml> 2006, (last 
accessed Aug 30, 2007). 
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IP-based Nodal dependent 
(12+ miles) 




In this example, the use of SNC Corporations Tacticomp 
products as an exemplar will demonstrate only one option.  
There are numerous other vendors, but the authors decided 
to use one currently fielded communication suite to 
demonstrate the potential.  The overall platoon complement 
of radios is a combined total of 46 per platoon. 
  
2030 15 October, after 36 hours in zone, the two DO 
platoon’s teams are dispersed and positioned along a 
extended frontage in order to observe as much battlespace 
as possible.  At this time a Team B observes two groups of 
armed men in pickup trucks moving towards the village of 
Khutaylah from the west.  Using an enhanced video feed that 
is built into the IP-based system, the PS directs a member 
of his Team to send a live night-time feed via multi-cast 
video to all platoon members in order to ensure all platoon 
members identify the potential threat.  Via chat and 
utilizing a pre-formatted SITREP, the team reports their 
position has not been compromised and that they will 
continue to observe from their observation position.   
 2040 15 October, Based on the complement of weapons 
seen by the PC and as a result of the Team B’s SITREP, the 
PC initiates a call for CAS via a mono-cast transmission 
between himself and Team B.  During the CAS request, the PC 
identifies the PS subnet ID and advises the DASC of that 
the PS will control fires and reconfirms his subnet ID.  At 
this point, a Section of Air Force F-16s is returning from 
an aborted mission.  The F-16s are cleared through DASC to 
work directly for Team B PS and immediately come up via 
VOIP with the PS.  At that time, the PS transmits the 
current video feed of the target and the laser designation 
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grid for the target.  The section leader re-confirms all 
blue force locations and the friendly lead trace which he 
automatically received and propagated on his in-flight 
computer.   
 2055 15 October, as final preparations for the strike 
are completed, the two teams of insurgents begin to move 
out of their location.  The first truck speeds west towards 
Khutaylah and the platoon’s operating base, while the 
second is delayed due to vehicular issues.  While the 
insurgents are working to repair the vehicle, the first 
BLU-126/B hits the building and destroys the structure, 
damaging the vehicle and the scattering the remaining 
insurgents. 
2100 15 October, the section of F-16s reports that due 
to their previous mission, they have no more time on 
station and immediately depart the sector.  Since Team B 
has maintained observation of the insurgents through the 
use of NVG, the final task of destroying the target is 
tasked to the Marines of Team B, while the task of 
destroying the remaining vehicle falls to the PC and Team 
A.  The PS finalizes the coordination required to execute 
an assault on the remaining insurgents by sketching the 
scheme of maneuver on an overlay that is built into the 
PLI/GPS system.  The PS then sends this overlay via file 
transfer to the PC via mono-cast broadcast.  The PC 
immediately views the intended action and sends his 
approval.  The PS receives the approval and multicast the 
overlay to his two squads.  In a follow on file transfer 
the PC transmits to the PS, via mono-cast, the overlay 
which depicts the location for Team A’s forthcoming ambush.  
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The PS verifies the receipt of his mission and acknowledges 
that PC and Team A will engage the escaping truck. 
2215 15 October, the PS, utilizing his laser 
designator, marks the escaping vehicle and transmits the 
grid via chat to PC to assist in the overall prosecution of 
the target.  Based on traffic sent via video feed to ID 
target, and chat to further identify target location, the 
PC initializes a hasty ambush.  Utilizing multi-cast, an 
overlay for the forthcoming ambush is sent via file 
transmission that indicates enemy location, primary and 
alternate ambush sites, fields of fire for squads, and 
commander’s intent.  PC further directs both squads via 
multi-cast VOIP.  1st squad is to set up on the far side of 
the road and is to engage when the truck is in sight.  2nd 
squad is to stay on the near side and support 1st squad when 
the insurgents dismount.   
2225 15 October, concurrent with Team A’s planning; 
the PS and Team B begin their assault on the remaining 
insurgents who have taken up a defensive position in a 
structure adjacent to the destroyed building.  Team B, 
utilizing its 3rd squad as a support by fire position and 
its 4th squad as an assault unit, begins its attack on the 
insurgents held up in the smaller structure.  This was all 
drawn into an overlay and transmitted to all members of 
Team B via multi-cast.  Via VOIP, the PS detailed that he 
would travel with the assault.  Since each Marine carries a 
IP-based radio, each Marine’s lead is traced will be 
continuously transmitted to all Team B members and 
therefore visible to support by fire squad.  Additionally, 
target reference point, fire control measures are 
transmitted on an overlay via multi-cast from PS to Team B 
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members.  Enhanced with these capabilities, Team B’s 
assault was successful.  During the assault, the target 
reference points and phase lines depicted on the squad COP 
ensure all members of the team are clearly visible and 
assist in the team’s ability to deconflict action on the 
ground.  During the assault, the remaining insurgents were 
killed and an enormous amount of intelligence was collected 
from the destroyed building, truck, and from the 
neutralized insurgents.  This data was collected 
immediately via video and transmitted to headquarters for 
further exploitation.  Additionally, prior to the assault, 
the platoon guide transmitted the Battle Damage Assessment 
from the CAS. 
 Concurrent with Team B actions, Team A engages the 
vehicles and the insurgents which were heading toward 
Khutaylah.  The insurgents are engaged and the vehicles 
come to a halt just west of the ambush site, immediately 
firing in the direction of 1st squad.  Communication traffic 
over the IP-based radio is kept to a minimum as a result of 
the availability of data being transmitted over the COP.  
Additionally, Marines rely upon training to work through 
the fog of war, but even with NVG’s, it is difficult to 
discern good guys from bad.  A team from 2nd squad 
identifies an opportunity to establish a support by fire 
position and has no time to transmit his intention.  
Instead, seeing an opportunity to seize the initiative and 
meet his commanders intent, he dashes his team across the 
road to support 1st squad.  1st squad is able to identify 
this movement via PLI of the adjacent unit on the COP.  As 
a result of the 2nd squads exploitation the conflict between 
the insurgents and Team A ends immediately. 
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0035 16 October, after a few hours of site 
exploitation and intelligence gathering, the PC transmits 
to the entire platoon via VOIP broadcast.  The PC conducts 
a quick read back of all data consolidation after the CAS 
strike, assault, and ambush and transmits this data and any 
additional video and imagery, as well as after action data 
in report formats and in historic overlays.    
0200 16 October, after headquarters has confirmed 
receipt of after-action, the PC orders the PS and Team B to 
their new observation positions via mono-cast file 
transfer.  As the PS moves his teams to their positions, 
the PC follows send his final patrol order which indicates 
that continued patrolling is required.  Team A and the PC 
remained tied into the structure of the former border fort, 
while Team B pushed back out to an overwatch position well 
out of sight of the town and away from the previous 
compromised observation site.  Once in their observation 
position, the COP self-generates and the follow-on reports 
arrive via chat throughout the early morning. 
2200 17 October, Team A is nearing completion of their 
patrol when it is tasked to conduct a physical link-up with 
a DO platoon who would be patrolling to the northeast and 
adjacent for the forthcoming days.  Mission orders released 
prior to crossing the Line of Departure (LOD) indicate the 
subnet ID of the second platoon and thanks to the self-
forming network, communication with second platoon can be 
made well before the platoon departs its current location 




Scenario Analysis: The scenario given above depicts 
the benefits that a properly equipped DO platoon operating 
within a network-centric battlespace can achieve during 
combat operations.  With fewer radio sets, Marines are able 
to easily expand communications across a much larger 
battlespace and interact directly with more supporting and 
adjacent units.  Further, this provides direct access to 
the GIG through reachback and develops the COP at the 
Tactical, Operational, and Strategic levels of command.  
Not having to continually switch radio sets to communicate 
within the platoon simplifies information transfer and 
reduces the fog of war, by not having to bring them in the 
first place, reduces the burden the Marine has to carry.  
Finally, the ability to transmit data (video, imagery, 
biometrics, PLI and files needed to update the COP) further 
reduces uncertainty, assists in the dissemination of 
decision-making, and helps in the advancement of small unit 
leaders vigorously pursuing the commander’s intent in 
accordance with the warfighter mentality.  
Until the Marine Corps truly transitions from legacy 
radio equipment to IP-based equipment, they will continue 
to fight in the fog. 
I. CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter provided numerous insights into new 
technologies that provide remarkable benefits to the 
organization as a whole and the warfighter specifically; 
among these are increased operational picture at all 
levels, versatile communications packages, more capable 
communications equipment, clear communications, reduction  
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in weight of overall number of devices taken into combat, 
and reduced fog of war with a COP through connectivity to 
the GIG.   
The authors posit that the Marine Corps must take 
decisive action to bring their communications architectures 
into the 21st century and align their vision with that of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Vision 2020. The 
technologies described earlier in this chapter are just a 
sampling of what is available currently and how civilian 
corporations are working to develop suites of products to 
answer the call by the DoD. Unfortunately, the Marine Corps 







[Distributed Operations] is not about distance 
between units; it is about superbly trained and 
equipped small unit leaders and tactical units 
that give our operational-even strategic-
commanders an additional weapon in the brutal, 
yet increasing sophisticated, Global war on 
Terrorism. 
       Vincent J. Goulding67 
A. WHY FIX WHAT IS SOON TO BE BROKEN?  
Organizations, specifically the DoD, have consistently 
been resistant to change for a number of reasons. The 
Marine Corps, though, has led the way in adapting to 
rapidly changing environments throughout the Marine Corps’ 
history. The Marine Corps have innovated amphibious 
landings, close air support, vertical envelopment, Combined 
Action Platoons, and encouraged command initiative to be 
taken at the lowest level possible. This needs to happen 
for communications, as well. As demonstrated in the body of 
this thesis, the current telecommunications architecture is 
insufficient to handle the needs of the newest Marine Corps 
innovation, the Distributed Operations platoon. 
Despite advancing such progressive innovations as the 
DO concept (currently fielding between two and four 
infantry battalions68) the Marine Corps persists in 
equipping these Marines with a complement of legacy 
equipment similar to that discussed in Chapter II and seen 
                     67 Colonel Vincent Goulding, Jr. USMC (ret), Director, MCWL, 
Distributed Operations, Feb 10, 2006, briefing.  
68 Mark Richter (Program Manager MERS, MARCORSYSCOM), interviewed by 
Chris C. Curran, request for information on the MERS Program, July 22, 
2007. 
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in Table 1.  The authors understand the desires of the 
Marine Corps to urgently equip the infantryman with the 
most advanced communications equipment available, but the 
authors feel that continuing to field legacy equipment 
serves only as a stop gap method and is not a true 
solution, as it only adds to the logistical burden of the 
individual Marine and inhibits the needed evolution to 
Network-Centricity.  Until the Corps completely severs 
itself from legacy communication equipment and adopts an 
IP-based system it will continue to fall short of 
effectively transitioning the nations forces to a Network-
Centric vision. As a result, the Corps will continue to lag 
behind each of its sister services and national allies.  
The authors see this as a critical flaw in the vision of 
the Marine Corps and one that could potentially be fatal as 
communications technologies proceed to outpace the Corps’ 
ability to modify legacy systems in order to stay connected 
to the network. 
Today, the USMC continues to press forward with the 
concept of DO through laboratories and schools such as the 
Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL) and the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS).  MCWL continues to push the 
envelope of DO with at least a half dozen different Limited 
Objective Exercises (LOE) in the forthcoming two69 years, 
while NPS continues to work hand-in-hand with sister 
services conducting experiments and research during 
quarterly Tactical Network Topology (TNT) field 
experiments.  The focus of these experiments is on 
equipping small units with innovative communication systems 
                     69 Colonel Vincent J. Goulding Jr., “RE: Visit to MCCDC on 13 SEP?,” 
Jul 24, 2007, personal email (Aug 28, 2007). 
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that provide the C2 backbone needed to dominate in the 
aforementioned infestation or swarming warfare arena.  The 
DO unit will remain connected through technology, lethal 
through integrated fires, and capable through increased 
training at all levels.  This transition from a chain 
network to an all channel network facilitates and forces a 
transition from what James D. Thompson describes as a 
“pooled, sequential interdependency” to a “pooled, 
reciprocal interdependency.”70  The DO concept at the very 
least equals any cutting edge adaptation in the history of 
the Marine Corps and once coupled with dynamic 
technological advances is the right fix at the right time. 
B. CONCLUSION  
As the authors described in the benefits section of 
Chapter IV, the author’s research has shown there has been 
a tremendous amount of effort placed on bridging the gap 
between current legacy radio technology and imminent 
transition to IP-based technologies (Tsirlis and Craig) 
such as those that are being evaluated and fielded by the 
Stryker Brigades and Ranger Battalions.  The ability to 
pass data and information between these two radically 
different forms of communication will be of enormous value 
and is critical for the nodal IP-based system to function 
in the NCW of tomorrow.    
To properly adapt the USMC’s doctrinal communication 
networks to the advancing threats and to meet forthcoming 
                     70 James D. Thompson, Organizations in Action: Social Science Bases 
of Administrative Theory, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), pages 54-55, 
references in Roberto Weber, Organizational coordination: A game-
theoretic view, (Pittsburgh:  Carnegie Mellon University, School of 
Social and Decision Sciences, 2005), pp.14-29. 
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technological advances the USMC must take the lead from its 
other services in the rapid deployment of future combat 
communication systems.  The authors feel that if the Marine 
Corps is to live up to its expeditionary nature, the Marine 
Corps must be the first ashore with a communication 
architecture that is interoperable with all services, lest 
they dictated to as to which flavor of communication is 
available at the time. This can be done no better than with 
the use of IP-based communication systems as described 
throughout this thesis.   
The Marine Corps is headed toward a precipice but can 
easily avert disaster by developing and adopting a 
communications architecture that is removed from legacy, 
push-to-talk radios.  The Marine Corps Warfighting Lab 
(MCWL) have indicated an interest in IP-based systems, but 
to-date, no efforts have been enacted to equip Marine DO 
units with this technology.  The Marine Corps has always 
been the leader in innovating adaptive warfighting 
techniques and been on the cutting edge of new platforms 
such as the AV-8B, MV-22, and the EFV, why do they fail to 
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